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ARTICLES
RECKLESSNESS, INTENT, AND WAR CRIMES:
REFINING THE LEGAL STANDARD AND
CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL




This Article explores the substantive and procedural aspects of the assertion
that recklessness i  included on the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes as a
matter of customary international aw. The substantive aspect of the inquiry,
in Part I, engages in a critical assessment of the assertion that the jurispru-
dence of international criminal tribunals indicates that recklessness is suffi-
cient to support a war crimes prosecution in general. The procedural aspect, in
Part II, contests the prevailing "principal-agent" construct of describing the
relationship between states and international criminal tribunals and the result-
ing role of tribunals in establishing customary international law. After rejecting
the prevailing construct, the Article introduces the "designate and extend"
model to clarify the relationship between states and international criminal
tribunals.
The substantive inquiry in Part I demonstrates that the jurisprudence of
international criminal tribunals does indicate that recklessness is included on
the mens rea spectrum for war crimes, but only in specific, limited conditions.
The procedural inquiry in Part II, while applying the new designate and extend
model, confirms the role of decisions by international criminal tribunals as a
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subsidiary-rather than primary-source of customary international law. The
substantive aspect of the inquiry addresses the specific issue of the spectrum of
mens rea for war crimes in order to refine the existing legal standard, while the
procedural aspect adopts a broader approach to clarify the general relationship
between states and international criminal tribunals. Both inquiries address
unsettled issues that are central to the theory and practice of public interna-
tional law.
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I. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
"As you know, individuals who commit serious violations of the laws
of war with criminal intent-that is, intentionally or recklessly-are re-
sponsible for war crimes."' This observation was offered by Human
Rights Watch to then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter following the
October 2015 attack on the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) trauma
center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan, that tragically killed forty-two civil-
ians, injured dozens more, and destroyed the MSF hospital.2 That reck-
lessness is a sufficient mens rea to support a war crimes prosecution as a
matter of customary international law is a common refrain in the theory
and practice of international law. Is this recklessness assertion, however,
deserving of the widespread acceptance it seems to have achieved?
The assertion that recklessness is included on the spectrum of mens
rea for war crimes involves separate substantive and procedural inqui-
ries of equal significance. From a substantive perspective, assessing the
recklessness assertion requires a detailed examination of relevant sour-
ces of international criminal law because the assertion typically relies
on jurisprudence from international criminal tribunals for support.
From a procedural perspective, the unsettled relationship between
states and international criminal tribunals must be satisfactorily clari-
fied because the prevailing recklessness assertion relies primarily on
international criminal law for support, while states retain primary
responsibility for adjudicating alleged offenses that occur during
armed conflict. This Article explores both inquiries with the dual
objectives of refining the customary mental element for war crimes
and of bringing clarity to the role of international criminal tribunals as
a source of customary international law.
Both the substantive and procedural aspects of the inquiry are of crit-
ical importance in the theory and practice of public international law.
Substantively, the issue of intent often constitutes the dividing line
between tragic accident and war crime. Very often, the material facts
involving the outcome of an attack that results in civilian casualties are
not in dispute. What remains unresolved is where to draw the line
between war crime and mistake. If recklessness is indeed included on
the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes, many accidents can be classi-
fied among the most serious violations of international law-and
1. Letter from Sarah Margon, Washington Dir., Human Rights Watch, to Ashton Carter, Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't. Def. 2 (Dec. 17, 2015), Re: Attack on MSF Hospital in Kunduz, http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/supporting resources/hrwjletter to_sec_defcarteronmsf strike.pdf.
2. Medecins Sans Frontieres, Kunduz HospitalAttack: MSFFactsheet (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.
doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/kunduz-hospital-attack-msf-factsheet.
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potentially subject the alleged perpetrators to prosecution domestically
by any capable state. If recklessness is not included on the spectrum,
most accidents will not qualify as war crimes. Procedurally, the ostensive
characterization of the jurisprudence from international criminal tribu-
nals as a primary source of international law-which is required to sup-
port the prevailing recklessness assertion-constitutes a substantial
expansion of the collection of primary sources of customary interna-
tional law. If state practice and opinions from international criminal tri-
bunals are in conflict and both possess authority as primary sources,
the precise content of international law is indeterminate.
One central basis for the persistent ambiguity concerning both inqui-
ries is a pervasive lack of precision in existing literature and practice
involving the topics. The broad diversity of conduct that can qualify for
characterization as a war crime is typically considered in unitary fashion
when describing a mens rea standard that purportedly applies uniformly
across the spectrum of relevant conduct. Similarly, existing discourse
involving the function of international criminal tribunals as a source of
customary international law generally fails to distinguish between differ-
ent components of international criminal law and therefore lacks the pre-
cision needed to adequately define that role. Another factor that
contributes to the persistent ambiguity inherent in both inquiries is the
fragmented nature of scholarship and practice involving both topics.
What is needed is a holistic approach that considers relevant factors with
adequate precision and that consolidates pertinent considerations from
across disparate sources of practice and scholarship. The present exami-
nation seeks to offer the degree of precision and integration needed to
satisfactorily inform both unsettled issues.
The inquiry begins by establishing in detail the contours of the prevail-
ing assertion that recklessness is included on the spectrum of mens rea that
is generally applicable for war crimes as a matter of customary international
law. This description provides a framework for the examination that fol-
lows. The inquiry draws necessary structure from the widely-cited reckless-
ness assertion in the sweeping Customary International Humanitarian Law
(CIHL) study published by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). The relevant provision of the CIHL study asserts, "[i]nternational
case-law has indicated that war crimes are violations that are committed wil-
fully, i.e., either intentionally (dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis)."
3. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
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This purported rule of customary international law evokes two dis-
tinct lines of inquiry that require critical assessment. The substantive
aspect of the assertion involves investigating whether "international
case-law" truly has established, with sufficient certainty to support inclu-
sion as a "rule" of customary international law, that war crimes can be
committed either intentionally or recklessly. The procedural aspect of
the assertion involves the degree to which, if at all, "international case-
law" can be relied upon as a primary source when describing a pur-
ported rule of customary international law. The analysis performed in
this Article is structured to assess each aspect, the substantive and pro-
cedural, in turn.
In Part One, the substantive analysis begins with the single example
of "international case-law" cited by Rule 156 in support of the reckless-
ness assertion, an opinion from the Delalic case of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After determin-
ing that Delalic and two other lines of cases involving recklessness as a
mental state for war crimes do not support the broad assertion from
Rule 156, a fourth line of cases that starts with the ICTY Gali case is
assessed. After demonstrating that the GaliW recklessness line of cases
is irreparably flawed, the statute and relevant jurisprudence from
the International Criminal Court, as a central example of "interna-
tional case-law" apart from the ICTY, are examined. The analysis at
the conclusion of Part One determines that "international case-law"
does not support the assertion that recklessness is included on the
spectrum of mens rea for war crimes without significant limitations
and qualifications.
Part Two then turns to consider the procedural aspect of the reckless-
ness assertion. This portion of the analysis engages with the widely-
contested role of international tribunals in establishing customary
international law. Since the initial development of contemporary inter-
national criminal law in the aftermath of World War II, the precise rela-
tionship between states and international criminal tribunals-and the
corresponding role of international tribunals as a source of customary
law-continues as a matter that is widely debated. After considering
and rejecting the prevailing approach utilized to describe the relation-
ship between states and international tribunals, the "principal-agent"
model, Part Two develops a new approach to define the relationship.
This new approach, the "designate and extend" model, is then applied
to the recklessness assertion to demonstrate that the assertion is defi-
cient from a procedural perspective as well. Before engaging in a com-
prehensive analysis of the assertion that recklessness is a sufficient
mental state to support a war crimes prosecution as a matter of
2020] 5
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customary international law, it is helpful to first bring focus to the vari-
ous applications of the recklessness assertion.
II. THE RECKLESSNESS ASSERTION
Broadly speaking, the recklessness assertion typically takes one of two
forms. One general form of the assertion is a reference directly to Rule
156 of the ICRC CIHL study, either as the sole source of authority in
support of the assertion or, at least, as a leading source. This seems to
have emerged as the preferred method for the organization Human
Rights Watch,4 including for the letter involving the Kunduz attack sub-
mitted to Secretary Carter,5 and it is a common approach in scholarship
involving the topic as well.6 The other general form of the recklessness
assertion is based on citations of international criminal tribunal opin-
ions, particularly ICTY opinions.7 As the analysis in Part One describes,
4. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING SAADA: UNLAWFUL COALITION AIRSTRIKES ON
SAADA CITY IN YEMEN, 43 n.79 (June 30, 2015), www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-
saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes-saada-city-yemen (asserting that "[c]riminal intent [for war
crimes] has been defined as violations committed intentionally or recklessly" and citing to the
ICRC CIHL study while noting the reference of the study to the ICTYDelali case); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HIDING BEHIND THE COALITION: FAILURE TO CREDIBLY INVESTIGATE AND PROVIDE REDRESS
FOR UNLAWFUL ATTACKS IN YEMEN, 19 n.20 (Aug. 24, 2018), www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/24/
hiding-behind-coalition/failure-credibly-investigate-and-provide-redress-unlawful (asserting that
serious violations of the law of armed conflict, when "committed by an individual with criminal
intent-that is, intentionally or recklessly," are war crimes, and citing only to Rule 156 of the
ICRC CIHL study); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THEY'VE SHOT MANY LIKE THIS": ABUSIVE NIGHT RAIDS
BYCIA-BACKED AFGHAN STRIKE FORCES, 46 n.155 (Oct. 31, 2019), www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
report_pdf/afghanistan1019_web.pdf (asserting that "[s]erious violations of international
humanitarian law committed with criminal intent-that is, deliberately or recklessly-
are war crimes" and citing only to Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study).
5. See Letter from Sarah Margon, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., STUART CASEY-MASLEN & STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED: THE CONDUCT
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 128-29 (2018) (describing the interpretation
reflected in Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study that the term "willfully" in the context of war crimes
means "deliberate intent" or "recklessness" as a reflection of customary international law); CHILE
EBOE-OSUJI, 'GRAVE BREACHES' AS WAR CRIMES: MUCH ADO ABOUT...'SERIOUS VIOLATIONS'? 2-3,
https: //www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/827EE9EC-5095-48C-AB04-E38686EE9A80/283279/
GRAVEBREACHESMUCHADOABOUTSERIOUSVIOLATIONS.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2020)
(citing Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study as direct support for the assertion that the term "willfully"
in the context of war crimes means intentionally or recklessly).
7. See, e.g., CIHL study, supra note 3, at 568-603; Adil Ahmad Haque, What the Kunduz Report
Gets Right (and Wrong), JUST SECURITY (May 10, 2016), wwwjustsecurity.org/30986/kunduz-report-
and-wrong ("With respect to customary international law, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has repeatedly held that it is a war crime to 'willfully' attack
civilians, where 'the notion of 'wilfully' incorporates the concept of recklessness, whilst excluding
mere negligence"'); Brian Finucane, Partners and Legal Pitfall, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 407, 410 (2016),
[Vol. 526
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the ICTY finding that recklessness is sufficient to support a war crimes
prosecution is founded upon an ICRC assertion to that effect.
Whether assertions from the venerable ICRC or opinions from the
ICTY are directly cited for support, it seems that all, or at least most,
roads in the recklessness assertion lead to the ICRC.
The analysis in this Article, then, is structured on the ICRC reckless-
ness assertion that is reflected in Rule 156 of the CIHL study even
though drawing on this formulation is not an absolute requirement in
order to critically assess the general recklessness assertion. The specific
text of the "rule" represents a useful summary of the recklessness asser-
tion because the general assertion is composed of the same constituent
elements-a substantive assertion regarding the conclusions of "inter-
national case-law" and a procedural reliance on jurisprudence from
international criminal tribunals-as the text of Rule 156. Because of
the valuable structure it provides and because the text is widely cited in
support of the recklessness assertion, the present inquiry is organized
around this formulation to address both aspects-substantive and pro-
cedural-of the customary "rule" described in the ICRC CIHL study.
With the structure of the inquiry and the contours of the recklessness
assertion thus described, the analysis turns now to consider the substan-
tive aspect of the assertion.
III. PART ONE: SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE RECKLESSNESS ASSERTION
The widely-cited recklessness assertion established in the ICRC CIHL
"rule" observes, "[i] nternational case-law has indicated that war crimes
are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally
(dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis)."' In support of this asser-
tion, Rule 156 cites a single ICTY opinion which was published as part
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1694&context=ils (citing to
several ICTY cases in support of the observation that "certain serious LOAC violations, such as
intentionally or recklessly attacking civilians or civilian objects, including specifically protected
objects, constitute war crimes"); W.J. Fenrick, Senior Legal Advisor, ICTY Off. of the
Prosecutor, Public Remarks, Crimes in Combat: The Relationship Between Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes 6 (Mar. 5, 2004), www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E7C759C8-C5A4-
4AD3-8AB5-EF6ED68AC1D4/0/Fenrick.pdf (expressing the "conscious effort" of the office of
the prosecutor to "argue that the law concerning unlawful attacks against civilians is, in
substance, the same in both international and internal conflicts" and describing the 2003 ICTY
Galic Trial Chamber opinion, which determines that recklessness is a component of the mental
state of "wilful" as the "most thoughtful and elaborate decision to date by an ICTY chamber
concerning unlawful attack charges against civilians").
8. See Prosecutor v. GaliC, Case No. IT-98-29-T, TrialJudgement, ¶ 54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
9. CIHL study, supra note 3, at 574, Rule 156.
2020] 7
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of the Delalit case.'0 The procedural matter of whether jurisprudence
from international criminal tribunals can be cited as a primary source
in the effort to articulate a provision of customary international law is
considered infra in Part Two. First, the substantive issue of whether
"international case-law" actually does indicate that war crimes can be
committed either intentionally or recklessly is critically assessed.
A. The Spectrum of Mens Rea
At the outset of the substantive evaluation, a brief overview of the
spectrum of mens rea is useful since Rule 156 describes "intention-
ally" as synonymous with "dolus directus" and "recklessness" as synon-
ymous with "dolus eventualis." In relation to the Kunduz airstrike that
prompted the letter submitted from Human Rights Watch to the
Secretary of Defense, the internal U.S. military investigation con-
cludes that the attack does not constitute a war crime because the
MSF trauma center was not attacked "intentionally."" Relying on
the specific term "intentional" for an assessment of the applicable
mental state is problematic due to the significant degree of ambigu-
ity inherent in the term. As Jens David Ohlin succinctly observes in
relation to criminal law generally and international criminal law
specifically, "[t]he word ['intent'] is notoriously vague and captures
situations where the defendant desires a particular outcome as well
as situations where the defendant is aware of the practical certainty
of the outcome but is indifferent to the result.""
Because the concept of intent is "notoriously vague" and national
jurisdictions apply different mens rea models as a result of disparate
legal histories and traditions, consolidating a comprehensive-and
comprehensible-spectrum of the mental element for crimes can be a
10. The Delalit case is commonly referred to in ICTYparlance as the "Celebiti" case, which is
a reference to the Celebiti prison camp where the offenses adjudicated in the case occurred.
See, e.g., Press Release, ICTY, Celebiti Case: The Judgment of the Trial Chamber (Nov. 16,
1998), https://www.icty.org/en/press/celebici-case-judgement-trial-chamber-zejnil-delalic-
acquitted-zdravko-mucic-sentenced-7-years.
11. See Memorandum from U.S. Cent. Command, Summary of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma
Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015; Investigation and Follow-on Actions, https://
www3.centcom.mil/FOIALibiray/cases/16-0061/00.%20CENTCOM%20Summnay%20Memo.pdf. (last
visited Aug. 18, 2020). The Central Command memorandum asserts, "The label 'war crimes' is typically
reserved for intentional acts-intentionally targeting civilians or intentionally targeting protected objects"
(emphasis in original). According to the memorandum, because the "investigation found that the tragic
incident resulted from a combination of unintentional human errors and equipment failures," the
airstrike would not qualify as "intentional" and, therefore, would not be characterized as a war crime.
12. Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept ofIntent, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79, 82 (2013).
[Vol. 528
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challenge. While observations and explanations regarding comparative
application of mental elements in criminal law abound, Mohamed
Elewa Badar provides a particularly useful account when making a
"case for a unified approach" to the application of mens rea in interna-
tional criminal law. Although neither common law nor civil law jurisdic-
tions present monolithic applications of the concept of mens rea,'3
some general observations and comparisons are useful and apposite.
As Badar describes, what would generally be referred to as "dolus direc-
tus in the first degree" in a civil law tradition corresponds closely to the
"purpose" formulation established in the U.S. Model Penal Code
(MPC)." Similarly, "dolus directus in the second degree" corresponds
closely with the MPC formulation for "knowledge." These parallel
mens rea concepts appear to correspond with the reference to "inten-
tionally (dolus directus)" from the ICRC CIHL Rule 156 formulation. In
a "typical" common law mens rea construct, the line between "inten-
tional" and "reckless" would be drawn here-with "purpose" and
"knowledge" above the "intent" line-while this is not generally the
case for a "typical" civil law paradigm.
While various useful descriptions of the mens rea of dolus eventualis
are presented in literature involving the topic, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber decision in the Blaskit case offers a particularly effective and
succinct description of the concept. In the effort to consolidate a work-
able application of dolus eventualis, the opinion surveys the national
jurisdictions of France, Italy, and Germany, each of which adopts a civil
law tradition." The Blaskit formulation notes that, as the German
Federal Supreme Court has concluded, "in the case of extremely dan-
gerous, violent acts, it is obvious that the perpetrator takes into account
the possibility of the victim's death and, since he continues to carry out
the act, accepts such a result."'7 The ICTY opinion concludes that it is
13. E.g., Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. FORUM 291, 294 (2001) ("The
civil law is not a monolith; the common law is not a monolith").
14. MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR, THE CONCEPT OF MENS REA IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, THE
CASE FORA UNIFIED APPROACH 423 (2013).
15. Id. For a useful graphical consolidation of these and other mens rea concepts, see also
Sarah Finnin, Mental Elements underArticle 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Comparative Analysis, 61 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 325, 329 (Apr. 2012).
16. See generally Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute Without It?, 12 NEW
CRIM. L. REv. 433, 452-59 (2009) (comparing implementation of the concept of dolus eventualis in
selected civil lawjurisdictions, including Egypt, France, Italy, South Africa, and Germany).
17. Prosecutor v. Blaskit, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 39 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 29, 2004).
2020] 9
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this "volitional element" of being aware of the risk, accepting the result,
and acting even with the awareness of the risk that "denotes the border-
line between dolus eventualis and advertent or conscious negligence."1 8
When applied in a "typical" common law jurisdiction, dolus eventualis
is often described as being akin to recklessness, although dolus eventua-
lis is, at least in theory, more restricted in a way that the perpetrator
need not only be aware of the risk but must also accept the possibility
that the criminal consequence occurs.19 One useful way of describing
the volitional aspect of dolus eventualis in context is that the "offender
must 'reconcile himself' . . . to the prohibited result" of his or her
actions.20 Although this volitional element, at least theoretically, sets
dolus eventualis apart from the common law recklessness counterpart, as
Sarah Finnin observes, "[c]ommentators disagree ... on whether reck-
lessness (in common law) and dolus eventualis (in civil law) are really
different, and in what way."21 As Jens Ohlin similarly points out,
"[a] debate rages among international lawyers over whether dolus even-
tualis is exactly the same as recklessness, or whether it represents a men-
tal state that is slightly more culpable than common law recklessness
because it requires an identification with the evil result that represents
a malignant heart.""
While there seems to be no reason to doubt that dolus eventualis and
recklessness are conceptually distinguishable, in practical application
both formulations "would usually cover the same factual constella-
tions."2" This is because a perpetrator who is aware of a risk, which is
conceptually sufficient in the recklessness context, likely also factually
reconciles herself or himself to the possibility that the criminal conse-
quence will occur before the action is performed, which is the "addi-
tional" requirement to be demonstrated in the dolus eventualis context.
In any event, it is the ostensibly volitional requirement of "reconciling
oneself" with the possibility of the criminal outcome that, at least con-
ceptually, places dolus eventualis above the line for "intent" in a "typical"
civil law jurisdiction," while the absence of this volitional aspect places
18. Id.
19. ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVUDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 45
(2012).
20. Mohamed Elewa Badar, Mens rea-Mistake of Law & Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law:
A Survey for International Criminal Tribunals, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 203, 228 (2005).
21. Finnin, supra note 15, at 330.
22. Ohlin, supra note 12, at 89.
23. Finnin, supra note 15, at 336 (citation omitted).
24. While most continental civil law jurisdictions include dolus eventualis on the spectrum of
intent, the French model is unique in that, like the common law category, dolus eventualis is
[Vol. 5210
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recklessness below the conceptual line for "intent" in the common law
tradition.
Consolidating the various models of intent described above, then, it
is uncontroversial to include common law concepts of "purpose" and
"knowledge" on the spectrum of intent that is sufficient to sustain a war
crimes prosecution. These concepts roughly correlate with the civil law
application of dolus directus in the first degree ("purpose") and in the
second degree ("knowledge"). These mental element standards are
included on the spectrum of intent that is required to support a crimi-
nal prosecution pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court2 5 and, for example, in jurisprudence from the ICTY. 6
While there is some conceptual distinction between recklessness and
dolus eventualis, these terms are consolidated for present purposes since
they would usually cover the same factual constellations. Likewise, the
mens rea formulation asserted by Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study
uses the terms "recklessly" and "dolus eventualis" interchangeably.27 It is
the inclusion of the combined concepts of recklessness and dolus even-
tualis on the spectrum of mens rea that is, purportedly, sufficient to sup-
port a war crimes prosecution as a matter of customary international
law wherein the controversy is to be found. With the pertinent spec-
trum of mens rea thus briefly examined, the present inquiry regarding
the substantive aspect-whether "international case-law" actually does
support the recklessness assertion-continues.
applied as a transitional concept between intent and negligence. See BADAR, supra note 14, at 418
(characterizing the French model as "the only exception to a rule" that "continental law
jurisdictions do not operate with" an intermediary between intent and negligence). Even though
the French model stands alone in the continental civil law category by excluding dolus eventualis
from the spectrum of intent, the conceptual presence of the volitional element of the acceptance
of a risk is not a feature of the common law concept of recklessness.
25. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 30,July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into forceJuly 1, 2002), rev. 2010 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 54 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). The Galii trial chamber decision cites to the ICRC
Commentary to Additional Protocol I, infra note 54, to conclude that an accused "must have
acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing"
the consequences. This mens rea formulation adopted from the ICRC incorporates, without
controversy, the common law "purpose" and "knowledge" counterparts while, contentiously,
incorporating dolus eventualis into the spectrum of "intent."
27. Recall that the relevant text of Rule 156 asserts that "[i]nternational case-law has indicated
that war crimes are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally (dolus directus)
or recklessly (dolus eventualis)." CIHL study, supra note 3, at 574.
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B. ICTYJurisprudence: Detainee Abuse and the Cited Delalit Decision
The substantive analysis in Part One begins by examining the single
source cited by the ICRC recklessness "rule": the trial chamber decision
in the ICTY Delalit case. It is worth noting at the outset of the substan-
tive inquiry that referring to a single case in international criminal juris-
prudence is an insufficient predicate upon which to base an assertion
that any particular practice constitutes arule of customary international
law. However, the procedural examination, specifically assessing the
role of "international case-law" as a source of customary international
law, is performed in Part Two. For now, the Delalit opinion, along with
similar examples of "international case-law" that could ostensibly sup-
port the recklessness assertion but are not cited by the ICRC CIHL
study, are considered in order to assess the substantive aspect of the
recklessness assertion.
The ICTY Delalit case involves a group of four defendants, Zejnil
Delalid being the first name listed, that were accused of various serious
incidents of detainee abuse, including murder, at the Celebidi prison
camp in central Bosnia and Herzegovina during the armed conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.28 The portion of the Delalit trial chamber deci-
sion cited by the ICRC CIHL study in support of the recklessness asser-
tion involves the war crime of "wilful killing" or "murder," which the
chamber considers to be synonymous,29 of a detainee during armed
conflict. While exploring the legal standard to be applied, the chamber
observes that the war crime of murder involves an actus reus and mens
rea. For the actus reus, the chamber equates murder with "homicide of
all natures" and concludes "this actus reus is clearly the death of the vic-
tim as a result of the actions of the accused."3 0 The opinion then turns
to explore the mens rea that is required to support the war crime of
"wilful killing" or "murder."
The mens rea analysis begins by surveying various methods by which
several national jurisdictions apply the mens rea requirement to the
crime of murder.31 After the brief survey, the trial chamber concludes
that there can be "no doubt that the necessary intent, meaning mens
rea, required to establish the crimes of wilful killing and murder ... is
present where there is demonstrated an intention on the part of the
28. See generally Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, 1 3 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
29. See id. 1 433 (concluding, after a brief analysis, that "no difference of consequence flows
from the use of 'wilful killing' in place of 'murder"').
30. Id. 1 424.
31. See id. 11 434-437.
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accused to kill, or inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human
life." 32 This is the specific conclusion cited by the ICRC CIHL reckless-
ness assertion in support of the general observation that "war crimes
are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally
(dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis)."3
It is true that this formulation from the Delalit trial chamber opinion
supports the conclusion that recklessness is part of the spectrum of
mens rea required to sustain a prosecution for the murder of a
detainee. However, extrapolating from this limited application of reck-
lessness a broad statement regarding allwar crimes, including directing
attacks against civilian persons or objects, represents a category error
that renders the general conclusion erroneous. The conceptual and
practical distinctions between using force in a detention context and in
a targeting context is examined in the next section when assessing the
ICTY Galit line of cases. For now, it is worth noting that the mens rea
standard for the war crime of murder in the Delalit trial chamber deci-
sion involves a very specific circumstance of willful killing of a detainee.
More precisely, the factual record presented to the tribunal often
indicated that the abuse inflicted by the accused on various occasions
did not cause the direct and immediate death of the victim detainees.
Rather, in many cases the victims died from injuries sustained by severe
beatings several hours or days after the abuse ended and the accused
was no longer present with the victim. Under these circumstances, the
trial chamber determined that inflicting serious bodily injury "in reckless
disregard of human life" is tantamount to deliberately murdering the
victim.34
It is in this context-when a detainee is killed and "there is demon-
strated an intention on the part of the accused to kill, or inflict serious
injury in reckless disregard of human life"-that the Delalit trial chamber
"is in no doubt that the necessary intent, meaning mens rea, required
to establish the crimes of wilful killing and murder, as recognised in
the Geneva Conventions, is present."35 Further, it is "in this light that the
evidence relating to each of the alleged acts of killing is assessed and
the appropriate legal conclusion reached"36 by the Delalit trial cham-
ber. While Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL recklessness assertion cites
(exclusively) to this ICTY opinion in support of the assertion that
32. Id. 1 439.
33. CIHL study, supra note 3, at 574.
34. See, e.g., Delali, TrialJudgment, ¶¶ 823, 845, 855, 877, 894 & 908 (emphasis added).
35. Id. ¶ 439 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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"international case-law has indicated" that war crimes can be commit-
ted either "intentionally (dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis),"
the sole reference cited supports only a much more limited reckless-
ness assertion.
Based exclusively on the cited Delalit case, a more tenable observa-
tion is that an ICTY opinion has indicated that the war crimes of willful
killing and murder can be committed in the detainee abuse context in
two specific scenarios: first, when the accused deliberately kills the vic-
tim detainee; and second, when the accused inflicts serious injury in
reckless disregard of human life and the victim detainee later dies from
the injuries inflicted by the accused. Extrapolating from this limited
conclusion that war crimes generally can be committed "either inten-
tionally or recklessly" is not a faithful application of the finding-and
the reasoning provided to support the finding-of the cited Delalit
opinion.
This ICTY Delalit opinion is the only example of "international
case-law" cited by the ICRC CIHL study in support of the reckless-
ness assertion. However, there are other specific lines of ICTY
opinions that could potentially support the assertion that the juris-
prudence of international criminal tribunals has indicated that
recklessness is a sufficient mens rea to support a war crimes prose-
cution. Two of these lines of cases, one involving participation in
a joint criminal enterprise and the other involving command
responsibility, represent specific and limited circumstances, as
does the Delalit line. These two lines of cases are examined briefly
before considering the Galit line, which could potentially support
a more general recklessness assertion.
C. ICTYJurisprudence: Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility
In relation to the context of participation in a joint criminal enter-
prise, an ICTY appeals chamber decision in the Tadit case is the first to
articulate a standard that involves the possibility of recklessness as a suf-
ficient mens rea.37 The opinion considers three discreet categories of
co-perpetration for which the tribunal will evaluate the individual crim-
inal responsibility of the alleged co-perpetrators. The first two catego-
ries involve a common design of the co-perpetrators, and the third
category involves a joint criminal enterprise but not necessarily a
37. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 220 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former YugoslaviaJuly 15, 1999).
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common design. It is only in this third category ofjoint criminal enter-
prise cases that the appeals chamber determines that recklessness-
specifically the related mens rea concept of dolus eventualis-is suffi-
cient for a finding of criminal liability for a member of the enterprise.
More specifically, the opinion determines that for the first two cate-
gories of accomplice liability, actual personal knowledge of the specific
crime committed by the group and intent to contribute to that crime
are required for each co-perpetrator.38 The third category described by
the appeals chamber involving a joint criminal enterprise concerns
individual criminal responsibility for a specific crime the defendant co-
perpetrator did not necessarily intend to commit. For this category, the
appeals chamber determines that, as a threshold matter, the accused
must demonstrate "an intention to participate in and further the crimi-
nal activity or the criminal purpose."39
With the threshold thus established, the opinion determines that
"responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common
plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was fore-
seeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other mem-
bers of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk."40 This
foreseeability component related to responsibility for a crime "other
than one agreed upon" is described by the judgement as dolus eventua-
lis, or advertent recklessness.4 1 While Tadi represents an early example
of jurisprudence from the ICTY-it was the first contested case tried
before the trial chamber and the first contested trial to reach the appel-
late chamber-the mens rea construct related to cases of joint criminal
enterprise established in Tadic was later adopted and applied through-
out decisions of the tribunal, including the landmark Stakic case42 and
the Prli case,43 which was the last major decision published by the
appeals chamber for the tribunal.
Transitioning now to consider the context of command responsibil-
ity, the mens rea of recklessness as characterized by the tribunal
involves issuing orders to subordinates who go on to commit a crime.
38. See id. 1 228 (requiring shared intent to perpetrate a specific crime for the first category and
describing the second category as "really a variant of the first" and requiring "personal knowledge
of the system of ill-treatment" for the second category).
39. Id. 1 228 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. ¶ 228 (emphasis added).
41. See id. 220.
42. See Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 65 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006).
43. See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-A, AppealsJudgement, ¶ 587 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2017).
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In this context, the Blaskic appeals chamber determined that a "person
who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial ike-
lihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order,
has the requisite mens rea for establishing liability." 44 The opinion con-
cludes that, "an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional
element must be incorporated in the legal standard"" for command
responsibility and that "[o]rdering with such awareness has to be
regarded as accepting that crime."46 In the context of command
responsibility, then, the tribunal adopts a standard of dolus eventualis as
an adequate mens rea to support a war crime prosecution. The tribunal
applies this standard to the relevant factual record, whereby the appel-
lant, among other crimes, knew his subordinates were using prisoners
of war as human shields and failed to take action to stop the subordi-
nates from doing so.
Like inflicting serious bodily injury in "reckless" disregard for human
life from the DelaliW line of ICTY cases, the mens rea of recklessness in
the contexts of joint criminal liability and command responsibility
established in Tadit and Blaski, respectively, reflects only limited
applicability. In the general context of "recklessness" in a targeting sce-
nario, liability for a joint "criminal" enterprise would only attach,
according to the Tadic test, when an accused agreed to commit some
other crime, it was foreseeable that other members of the group would,
say, make civilians the object of attack, and the accused willingly took
the risk of engaging in the attack anyway. Pursuant to the Blaskic com-
mand responsibility test, a commander would need to order an attack
"with the awareness of the substantial likelihood" that subordinates
would, say, make civilians the object of attack "in the execution of that
order" in order for criminal liability to attach in a targeting context.
While each of these lines of cases establishes a limited basis on which to
conclude that "international case-law has indicated" that war crimes
can be committed either "intentionally" or "recklessly," there is one
line of ICTY cases that could ostensibly support a more general asser-
tion. The present inquiry turns now to the general recklessness tand-
ard reflected in an opinion from the ICTY Gali case.
44. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 29, 2004).
45. Id.¶ 41.
46. Id. 1 42.
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D. ICTYjurisprudence: Targeting in Armed Conflict
Although it is not cited by the ICRC CIHL study, the line of cases be-
ginning with the ICTY trial chamber opinion in the Galic case directly
involves the matter of whether an attack on civilians can be considered
a war crime if it is found to have been conducted recklessly. The trial
chamber in Gali determined that a "perpetrator who recklessly attacks
civilians acts 'wilfully'" 7 and that, in accordance with Article 85 of
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I),48 "wilfully
'making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack"' qualifies as a grave breach.49 This conclusion, that an attack
that causes death or serious injury to civilians qualifies as willful if it is
determined to be reckless, was upheld without significant discussion by
the appeals chamber5 ' and adopted as a matter of settled law in subse-
quent ICTY opinions.5 1 Careful scrutiny of the Galit recklessness stand-
ard, however, reveals that the mens rea formulation rests on a
questionable legal analysis and that the relevant judicial opinions do
not actually apply the dubious recklessness standard in practice.
1. Gali and the Foundation for Recklessness in Targeting
Civilians
In setting the foundation for determining that recklessness is a suffi-
cient mens rea in a targeting context, the Galic trial chamber opinion
cites directly to AP I to make the uncontroversial finding that "wilfully
'making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack"' qualifies as a grave breach.52 This finding supports the conclu-
sion that such conduct falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
tribunal. While the grave breach observation is uncontentious based on
47. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, TrialJudgement, ¶ 54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
48. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 85, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
49. GaiW, TrialJudgment, ¶ 54 (citing AP I, art. 85) (emphasis in original).
50. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, AppealsJudgment, ¶ 140 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (concluding that the "Trial Chamber's reasoning in this
regard is correct").
51. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, TrialJudgment, ¶ 240 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals
Judgment, ¶ 270 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former YugoslaviaJuly 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Perisic,
Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 201 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6,
2011).
52. GaiW, TrialJudgment, ¶ 54 (citing AP I, art. 85(3) (a)) (emphasis in original).
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a textual reading of AP I, it is a miscalculated attempt to interpret and
apply a definition for the mens rea of "willful" based on this textual
reading that introduces the error upon which the Galit recklessness
standard and the subsequent jurisprudence that applies the Galit stand-
ard are founded.
In search of an interpretation for the crucial mens rea concept of
willfulness, the trial chamber considers a single source, the ICRC com-
mentary on AP I, and simply "accepts this explanation"3" from the
ICRC with no discussion, critical assessment, or consideration of other
sources. The ICRC commentary upon which the trial chamber exclu-
sively relies asserts that the mens rea of willful "encompasses the con-
cepts of 'wrongful intent' or 'recklessness', viz., the attitude of an agent
who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility
of it happening."54 The Commentary concludes that, "on the other
hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when
a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences."5
Had the Galit trial chamber engaged in a careful and critical appraisal
of this characterization, a number of fundamental defects in the rea-
soning provided by the ICRC in support of the recklessness assertion
would have counseled against relying on this source, to the exclusion of
all others, as a correct formulation of the term "willful."
The initial flaw that is apparent, with even minimal investigation, in
the ICRC AP I Commentary mens rea assertion is the sources upon
which the assertion relies for support. The first source cited in support
of the mens rea claim simply discusses differences in national interpreta-
tions, as the Commentary itself acknowledges by observing that the
cited sources examine "various [mens rea] concepts which are not all
defined identically by national law."56 The second and final 7 source cited
by the ICRC Commentary in support of the assertion that recklessness
is included in the spectrum of mens rea for willfulness is the ICRC
Commentary itself. Specifically, the relevant citation5 8 directs the
53. Id.
54. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 3474 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter ICRC Commentary].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 994 n.14 (emphasis added).
57. The Commentary footnote being examined goes on to cite another provision of the
Commentary involving the discussion of "failure to act and on negligence," which is beyond the
scope of the current discussion involving recklessness and mens rea.
58. ICRC Commentary, supra note 54, at 994 n.14.
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reader to the discussion within the Commentary involving willfulness as
a mens rea in relation to Article 11 of AP I.
Besides the notable flaw of exclusively citing internally to the ICRC
Commentary to support an assertion made within the ICRC Commen-
tary, careful examination of the mens rea discussion related to Article
11 of AP I that is invoked by the discussion regarding Article 85 reveals
several deficiencies that render the ICRC interpretation erroneous.
Perhaps the most obvious fault is an ambiguity involving translation
that is invited by the method employed by the Commentary to consoli-
date two French terms into one English expression. Specifically, the
Commentary notes that the official French language version of AP I uti-
lizes the term "intentionnel" in Article 85 and "volontaire" in Article 11,
while the official English language version of the treaty employs the
term "wilful" in both instances.5 9 On this basis alone, the Commentary
determines "it is clear that there is no difference of meaning" between
the French and English interpretations of intent.60
This cross-language ambiguity that is invited by the ICRC methodol-
ogy is used to support the conclusion that, while mere negligence is
excluded, "the concept of recklessness that may come into play-the
[accused] accepts the risk in full knowledge of what he is doing-must
also be taken to be part and parcel of the concept of wilfulness."6' While
the conclusion that recklessness is "part and parcel" of willfulness is
clear, the source of the supposed definition of recklessness-the accused
"accepts the risk in full knowledge of what he is doing"-is not
explained at all. Furthermore, the supposition that "it is clear that there
is no difference in meaning" between the concepts of intent simply
because the French text of the treaty utilizes two different terms while
the English version uses only one term is not at all "clear." At the con-
clusion of an analysis that represents the linguistic equivalent of a carni-
val shell game, the ICRC Commentary concludes-with no support
other than a translation ambiguity and an unidentified source for a def-
inition of recklessness-that recklessness is "part and parcel" of the
mens rea concept of willfulness.
This contention, of course, does not withstand even negligible criti-
cal scrutiny. The existence of disparate broad categories of mens rea,
and specific nuances apparent within the various broad traditions,
among national understandings of mens rea in domestic criminal law
reveals the true diversity of this core concept. To conclude that because
59. Id. at 159 n.15.
60. Id.
61. Id. 1 493 (emphasis in original).
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the French text of a treaty utilizes two words to describe a specific men-
tal state while the English version uses one word indicates that there is
"no difference in meaning" between the French and English under-
standing of intent belies the richness and diversity inherent in different
understandings of intent. The assertion in the ICRC Commentary to
AP I that recklessness is "part and parcel" of willfulness on this basis
alone is not supportable by any measure of prudent analysis. That the
Gali decision simply "accepts this explanation" from the ICRC
Commentary and that subsequent ICTY decisions cite the Gali deci-
sion as support with no further independent analysis impugns the
entire line of reasoning involving recklessness and "willfulness" that
begins with the trial chamber decision in Galic. As such, further scrutiny
is warranted, rather than, as does the GaliW decision, merely accepting
the explanation reflected in the ICRC Commentary to AP I without crit-
ical analysis.
As an initial matter, the practical difference between a scenario, such
as in Delalic, where a person under the control of a belligerent is
wounded or killed and a scenario, such as in Gali, where civilians
are wounded or killed in a targeting context, must be considered.
This distinction is of central importance because the provision of
the ICRC Commentary to AP I that is relied upon by the Gali trial
chamber addresses Article 85 of AP I while referring internally to the
Commentary observations related to Article 11 of AP I. Article 11 of AP
I addresses the protection of persons "who are in the power of the
adverse Party" or otherwise detained, while Article 85 addresses the
same scenario and adds offenses that constitute violation of the target-
ing distinction and proportionality rules to the list of "grave breaches"
established by the treaty. If there is a legal and conceptual distinction
between attacking in a detention scenario and doing so in a targeting
scenario, as the analysis below affirmatively demonstrates, then this dis-
tinction must be adequately accounted for when formulating the legal
test for each. The failure of the ICRC AP I Commentary to distinguish
between the different contexts when comparing the mens rea required
for each renders the direct equivalence of Article 11 and Article 85 er-
roneous, along with the cursory "analysis" of the Gali trial chamber
that "accepts this explanation" with no critical evaluation.
In relation to a detention scenario, such as that considered in Delalic
and described in Article 11 of AP I, the presumption is that violent
force does not need to be used against the detainee because the
detainee has been rendered hors de combat and therefore no longer
qualifies as a military objective. As such, there is no cognizable military
necessity to use violent force against he detainee unless an agent of the
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detaining power must do so for some justifiable reason such as, for
example, in self-defense or to prevent an escape. Furthermore, there is
no question on the part of an agent of the detaining power that the
detainee is hors de combat because the agent has already perfected cus-
tody and control over the detainee.
In this scenario, which again is the single, specific scenario reflected
in Article 11 of AP I, the detainee is completely reliant upon the detain-
ing power for his or her care and wellbeing. Killing the detainee under
these circumstances, without an adequate affirmative defense, would
qualify for the grave breach of willful killing established in all four 1949
Geneva Conventions. Doing so, either with the intent to kill or with the
intent to inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life, quali-
fies for the war crimes of willful killing or murder pursuant to the
Delalic formulation.
The factual scenario involved in the Galic trial chamber decision is
fundamentally different-conceptually and as a matter of international
law-than the detainee abuse setting involved in the Delalic test.
Although there is presumably no justification to use force in the Delalic
detainee context absent an exception such as self-defense, the opposite
presumption prevails in the Galic targeting context. While articulations
of the general military necessity principle abound in the literature
involving armed conflict, one particularly concise and pertinent formu-
lation of military necessity observes, "[m]ilitary necessity permits a bel-
ligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of
force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least
possible expenditure of time, life, and money."6 2 Practical application
of the principle of military necessity is reflected in the AP I provision
involving military objectives, which establishes:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.63
The conceptual difference in the types of necessity involved in using
force in a targeting context and doing so in a detention context is
62. United States v. List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS 757, 1253 (1950) [hereinafter "Hostage Case"].
63. AP I, supra note 48, art. 52(2).
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succinctly suggested in the description by Jens Ohlin and Larry May of
necessity as a "cluster concept."64 According to this conceptual con-
struct, necessity in international law operates, depending on the factual
context, as a license, exception, or constraint. A combatant involved in
a targeting scenario in an armed conflict context is using force as a
license: that is, the combatant is engaged in an "action [that] is part of
a role, and to satisfy this role it is necessary for"65 the combatant to
employ force. The targeting context is conceptually and factually differ-
ent from the "necessity" to use force against a detainee. In the deten-
tion context, necessity for an individual soldier to use force against a
detainee could be conceptualized as an "exception to an otherwise
binding obligation in the sense that if it is necessary for one to act ...
one is entitled to use means . . . that would normally not be permissi-
ble."66 Because of the degree of power and control exercised by the
detaining power over detainees, necessity as it relates to the detaining
power (rather than to an individual soldier of the detaining power) is
better characterized as a constraint "that blocks a form of activity
[attacking detainees] due to the lack of necessity" that would permit
that activity.67
The conceptual incongruence involving the necessity of employing
force in the targeting and detention contexts is manifestly apparent in
the two different "streams" of the law of armed conflict. In the context
of detention in armed conflict, the presumption that violent force is
prohibited has deep historical roots"6 and continues to animate the so-
called "Geneva stream" of the law of armed conflict today.69 In the tar-
geting context, which is more closely related to the so-called "Hague
64. SeeJENS DAVID OHLIN & LARRYMAY, NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 2-6 (2016).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., WILLIAM WINTRHOP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2d ed. 1920) ("Modern
sentiment and usage have induced in the practice of war few changes so marked as that which
affects the status of prisoners of war. The time has long passed when 'no quarter' was the rule on
the battlefield, or when a prisoner could be put to death by virtue simply of his capture."); 2
FRANCIS LIEBER, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER 258 (1881) ("A prisoner of war
is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by
the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by
mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.").
69. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; AP I, supra note 48, art. 75. Specific
sections of AP I addressing the Geneva stream, along with the corresponding individual treaty of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are: Part II of AP I corresponds to the nature of protections
established in Geneva Conventions I and II of 1949; Part III, Section II of AP I corresponds to the
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stream" of the law of armed conflict, the often uncertain nature of the
enemy disposition70 combined with the requirement to "apply any
amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money"7 1
presents a glaring conceptual and practical contrast to engaging in an
attack in the detention context. This contrast between the detention
and targeting contexts is apparent in the string of understandings or
reservations to AP I published72 by States party, such as the United
Kingdom,73 Italy,74 Australia,75 New Zealand,7 6 Austria,7 7 and Canada,7 8
in the targeting context that do not apply equally in the detention con-
text. While it may be a common sentiment that the distinction between
the so-called Geneva and Hague streams of the law of armed conflict
is of declining importance79 since contemporary treaties tend to
consolidate provisions involving the two streams into a single
nature of protections established in GC III; and Part IV, Section II of AP I corresponds to the
nature of protections established in Geneva Convention IV of 1949.
70. See, e.g., Hostage Case at 1297 ("The course of a military operation by the enemy is loaded
with uncertainties, such as the numerical strength of the enemy, the quality of his equipment, his
fighting spirit, the efficiency and daring of his commanders, and the uncertainty of his
intentions.").
71. Id. at 1253.
72. For the sake of brevity and to avoid unnecessary repetition in the notes that follow, this
Article provides a brief summary of two main themes relevant to the present inquiry that emerge
from the specific understandings, declarations, and reservations cited in the six footnotes that
follow. First, the provision of AP I requiring attacks to be directed against military objectives does
not involve the issue of so-called "collateral damage." Second, law of armed conflict compliance
of personnel involved in an attack will be evaluated based on the information that is reasonably
available to them at the relevant time. See ICRC, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries-by
State for a useful compilation of, among other relevant documents, understandings, declarations,
and reservations of states that have ratified AP I, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Aug.
18, 2020).
73. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declaration and Reservations for
AP I, Re: Article 52 (Jul. 2, 2002).
74. See Italy, Declaration for AP I (Feb. 27, 1986).
75. See Australia, Declaration forAP I (Jun. 21, 1991).
76. See New Zealand, Declaration for API (Feb. 8, 1988).
77. SeeAustria, Reservations forAP I (Aug. 13, 1982).
78. See Canada, Reservations and Understandings for AP I (Nov. 20, 1990).
79. See, e.g., EMILY CRAwFORD & ALISON PERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 33 (2d ed.
2020) (asserting that the terms "Hague Law" and "Geneva Law" are "[u]seful as descriptive, but
essentially non-legal terms" that "efficiently summari[ze] the dual aims of" the law of armed
conflict); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Historical Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 22 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) (asserting that the "borderline between
Hague and Geneva Law has now largely been eroded and AP I contains elements of both these
legal traditions").
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document,8 0 the conceptual and practical distinction between the
two is still very much relevant and apparent. Conflating the two dis-
tinct streams in a legal analysis represents a category error that can
render the analysis conceptually deficient, notwithstanding the
trend in favor of textualmerger as a matter of convenience.
This conceptual conflation accounts for the legal error introduced
by the analysis reflected in the ICRC AP I Commentary when it asserts
that recklessness is "part and parcel" of willfulness and that reckless-
ness, therefore, qualifies in general as a grave breach. Both Article 11
and Article 85 of AP I include reference to the term "wilful" in describ-
ing conduct proscribed by the respective articles. However, Article 11
deals exclusively with protections for those "in the power" of an adver-
sary, while Article 85 refers specifically to the protections reflected in
Article 11 while adding violations that would occur in a targeting con-
text such as "making the civilian population or individual civilians the
object of attack."
The practical realities and different applications of the cluster con-
cept of necessity discussed above, as reflected in the state reservations
and understandings related specifically to provisions of AP I involving
the targeting context, require the scenario of "making the civilian pop-
ulation . . . the object of attack," which is reflected in Article 85, to be
considered differently than a scenario in which a detainee is "in the
power" of an adversary, which is reflected in Article 11. Treating the
two distinct contexts as conceptual equivalents renders the assertion in
the ICRC AP I Commentary that recklessness is "part and parcel" of
both contexts deficient. That the conceptual conflation relies on a
translation ambiguity and an unidentified legal standard makes the
assertion fundamentally implausible.
When the ICTY Gali decision simply "accepts this explanation"
by the ICRC AP I Commentary with no critical analysis, the trial
chamber adopts the same category error committed by the
Commentary to enunciate an erroneous mens rea standard. The
Gali appeals chamber concludes that the "Trial Chamber's reason-
ing in this regard is correct"" with no critical analysis. Likewise,
80. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, 1 75 (July 8) (briefly surveying the foundations of the Hague and Geneva streams and
observing that the textual convergence reflected in AP I "give [s] expression and attest[s] to the
unity and complexity of" the law of armed conflict).
81. AP I, supra note 48, art. 85(3) (a).
82. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, AppealsJudgment, ¶ 140 (Nov. 30, 2006).
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subsequent decisions simply adopt this dubious mens rea formula-
tion as a matter of settled law.8 3
Notwithstanding the adoption of a mens rea formulation with dubi-
ous foundations, careful analysis of the Galic opinion and the subse-
quent decisions that adopt the reasoning reveals that none of the
judgements actually do apply recklessness as a sufficient mental ele-
ment to support a prosecution for war crimes. The Galic opinion articu-
lating that recklessness is sufficient does so in the context of supporting
a guilty verdict for a defendant, General Stanislav Galik, who reportedly
conducted a coordinated and protracted "campaign of sniper attacks""4
and "artillery and mortar shelling"" against the civilian population of
Sarajevo without distinguishing between military objectives and civilian
objects. Without a doubt, these indiscriminate attacks were conducted
with "reckless disregard of human life," to borrow from the Delali reck-
lessness standard in the detainee abuse context. However, the Gali trial
chamber concludes that such attacks were, "at the very least, indiscrimi-
nate as to" the target, and were, therefore, directed at the civilian
population.86
Without describing it as such, the analysis in which the trial chamber
is engaged when evaluating these indiscriminate attacks is actually an
effort to differentiate between the mens rea concepts of "purposeful"
and "knowingly"-or, to borrow generally from civil law terminology, of
dolus directus in the first and second degrees. While the trial chamber
does not rule out the possibility that such attacks were conducted for
the purpose of targeting civilians, the opinion recognizes that this
higher level of mens rea is not necessarily required. By concluding that
the attacks were "at the very least indiscriminate,"8 7 the trial chamber
finds that the defendant knowingly made the civilian population the
object of attack while not ruling out the possibility that such attacks
were for the purpose of attacking civilians. Although the opinion uses
the word "reckless" to describe these indiscriminate attacks and doing
so is consistent with the dubious legal conclusion derived earlier in the
opinion, a careful analysis of the reasoning and the factual background
83. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, TrialJudgment, ¶ 240 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Judgment,
¶ 270 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No.
IT-04-81-T, TrialJudgment, ¶ 201 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011).
84. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, TrialJudgement, ¶ 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
85. See id.¶ 15.
86. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 345, 410 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
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reveals that the trial chamber finds that the defendant "at the very least"
knowingly attacked civilians.
If the trial chamber notes the ICRC AP I Commentary recklessness
assertion and "accepts this explanation" but does not actually apply the
standard in practice, what then is the trial chamber actually intending
to accomplish by "accepting" the recklessness explanation? It seems
that the trial chamber is, quite understandably, attempting to derive an
inherently objective standard by which to judge the fundamentally sub-
jective matter of whether the defendant made the civilian population
the object of attack. This rationale is evident from the legal conclusion
of the trial chamber that, in cases wherein the defendant claims there
was doubt as to the civilian nature of the persons or objects that were
attacked, "the Prosecution must show that in the given circumstances a
reasonable person could not have believed that the individual he or she
attacked was a combatant."8 8
This is the endeavor in which the trial chamber is actually engaged
later in the opinion as it evaluates the defense claim that the defendant
thought he was directing the sniper, artillery, and mortar attacks
against military objectives but that he accidentally killed civilians. The
Galit trial chamber never does conclude, to apply the explanation
of the ICRC AP I Commentary it accepts, that the defendant attacks
civilians "without being certain of a particular result, [but] accepts the
possibility of it happening." The facts the Galit trial chamber is adjudi-
cating are described in a later ICTY case as a "deliberate campaign ...
to attack the civilian population of Sarajevo."89 By finding that the
attacks were "at the very least indiscriminate as to" the target, the Galit
trial chamber is concluding that, contrary to claims by the defendant,
"in the given circumstances a reasonable person could not have
believed"90 the people that were attacked to be military objectives.
By engaging in this analysis, the trial chamber is simply establishing
an objective method by which to assess the subjective claims by the de-
fendant that he was not aware of the civilian nature of the people and
objects that were attacked. Although the opinion "accepts" the ques-
tionable recklessness assertion reflected in the ICRC AP I Commentary
without critical analysis, when applying the standard the trial chamber
concludes objectively that the defendant at least knowingly attacked
civilians despite the subjective assertions by the defendant to the
contrary. This application of the mens rea standard exceeds the
88. Id. 1 55 (emphasis added).
89. Peri4iW, TrialJudgment ¶ 553.
90. Id.
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recklessness threshold the GaliW trial chamber "accepts" from the ICRC
Commentary.
2. "Applying" the Gali Recklessness Test: ICTY Strugar and Perisic
Cases
After GaliW established the "precedent" involving recklessness and
mens rea, several ICTY opinions cite to and apply the ICRC/ Gali for-
mulation established therein. The trial chamber in Strugar, for exam-
ple, considered criminal liability for the offense of shelling the civilian
population with sustained artillery fire.91 In concluding its analysis, the
Strugar trial chamber acknowledges the Gali test with a degree of skep-
ticism9 2 and finds that "given the acceptance of an indirect intent as suf-
ficient to establish the necessary mens rea for murder and wilful killing
[as in Galicj], there appears to be no reason in principle why proof of a
deliberate artillery attack on a town occupied by a civilian population"
would not qualify as a criminal offense.93
In upholding the conclusions of the trial chamber, the appeals cham-
ber in Strugar accepts the trial chamber finding that the cause of the ci-
vilian casualties and damage to civilian objects in question "was the
deliberate shelling" of the civilian population by the defendants.94 The
appellate decision also endorses the finding of the trial chamber that
the "intent of the perpetrators of this attack was 'to target civilians and civil-
ian objects"' and that the attacks were, therefore, criminal.95 Similar to
the analytical endeavor reflected in the Gali trial chamber opinion, the
Strugar appeals chamber decision employs the mens rea formulation in
an attempt to objectively evaluate the defendant's subjective claim that
the object of attack was a military objective. The Strugar appeals chamber
decision, citing both the Gali trial chamber and appeals chamber,
observes that "depending on the circumstances of the case, the indiscrimi-
nate character of an attack can be indicative of the fact that the attack was
indeed directed against the civilian population."96
91. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, TrialJudgment, ¶ 345 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former YugoslaviaJan. 31, 2005) (characterizing the artillery attacks assessed by the tribunal in
this case as being conducted "without regard to military targets" and that the attacks were
performed "deliberately, indiscriminately and extensively over a prolonged time").
92. See id. ¶ 240. The Strugar trial chamber, after acknowledging the Gali' test, begins its own
finding with the qualification, "Whether or not [the Gali' reasoning] is so...."
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 272 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 17, 2008) (emphasis in original).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. 1 275.
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In any event, the deliberate shelling of civilian objects is determined
objectively by the Strugar trial chamber and appeals chamber to qualify
as a criminal offense. This finding corresponds with "purposeful" and
"dolus directus in the first degree" on the general common law and civil
law spectrum. As such, the dubious ICRC/ Gali recklessness mens rea
formulation is not applied in practice in the Strugar decisions.
The final example of ICTY jurisprudence to be considered here is
the Perisic case, a trial chamber opinion that was rendered nearly eight
years after the Galit trial decision was published. By the time of
Perisit, the ICRC/ Galit recklessness test had become a matter of set-
tled law within jurisprudence of the ICTY. In fact, the trial chamber
in Perisi recites the Gali finding that "'wilfulness' encompasses
both the notions of direct intent and indirect intent, that is, the con-
cept of recklessness, excluding mere negligence"97 as a mere formal-
ity, while citing to Galic and the same provision of the ICRC
Commentary cited in turn by Galic.
Although the Perisit trial chamber rotely recites the recklessness
standard articulated by the Gali opinion, the Perisic decision does not
have occasion to apply the dubious Gali recklessness formulation. This
is so because, as in Strugar, the Perisi trial chamber determines that the
attacks against the civilian population at issue in the case were "carried
out pursuant to a deliberate campaign of attacking civilians."98 Based
on the facts stipulated and adjudged in the case, the trial chamber
concludes that the defendant was responsible"9 for "widespread or
systematic attack[s] against the civilian population"0 0 that "resulted in
the killings of hundreds of civilians and the wounding of thousands
of others.""0 ' Like in Strugar, the trial chamber determines that the
facts being adjudicated constitute a deliberate campaign to attack
97. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, TrialJudgment, ¶ 100 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011).
98. Id. ¶ 538.
99. The nature of criminal liability for the defendant in PerisiW, as is the case for many criminal
proceedings adjudicated by international criminal tribunals, is command responsibility. It is
worth noting that the PeriiW appeals chamber reverses the convictions adjudged by the trial
chamber because the appeals chamber determines there are insufficient grounds to conclude
that the appellant exercised command responsibility for the units that engaged in the widespread
attacks on civilians. See Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 119 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). This reversal does not impugn the findings
and conclusions that a deliberate campaign of attacking civilians took place. Rather, the appeals
chamber decision simply reverses the finding that Perisic was criminally liable for the attacks on
the basis of command responsibility.
100. Peri<ic, TrialJudgment, ¶ 547.
101. Id. 1549.
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civilians.102 As such, just as in Strugar, the degree of mens rea being fac-
tually adjudicated by the Perisic trial chamber exceeds recklessness and,
instead, corresponds closely with purposeful or dolus directus in the first
degree on the mens rea spectrum.
E. Consolidating Recklessness and Mens Rea in ICTYjurisprudence
With a comprehensive assessment of recklessness as it is applied in
the jurisprudence of the ICTY, what is left of the assertion from Rule
156 of the ICRC CIHL study that "international case-law has indicated
that war crimes are violations that are committed" either intentionally
or recklessly? At least in the context of the ICTY, this assertion is sup-
ported by the jurisprudence, but with significant limitations. The single
example of "international case-law" cited by Rule 156, the Delalic trial
chamber opinion, concludes that the war crime of murder can be com-
mitted in the detention context when the defendant inflicts serious
bodily injury in "reckless disregard of human life" and when the victim
later dies as a result of the injuries."'3
A second limited context involving recklessness, as reflected in the
TadiW line, involves criminal liability for participation in a joint criminal
enterprise. In what is often referred to in literature"' on the topic as
"JCE III,"105 an accused can be held criminally liable for an act "other
than the one agreed upon in the common plan" if the "other" criminal
act was "foreseeable" and the accused "willingly took that risk."106 The
foreseeability of the risk of the "other" criminal act coupled with the
willingness to take that risk is described by the TadiW opinion as "dolus
eventualis," or "advertent recklessness."10 7 The third category of opin-
ions applying recklessness in a specific, limited context, involves com-
mand responsibility. This specific category, established in BlasWki,
102. Id. ¶ 320 (observing that civilians were "deliberately targeted and subjected to immense
hardships that served no military purpose" during the campaign of attacks being adjudicated).
103. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, TrialJudgement, ¶ 439 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
104. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, JCE III, the Rome Statute, and Bashir, OPINIO JURIS (Feb.
9, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/02/11/jce-iii-and-the-rome-statute; Guilia Biji, Joint
Criminal Enterprise in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the Prosecution of Senior Political and Military Leaders: The Krajisnik Case, 14 MAX
PLANKY.B. U.N. L. 51 (2010).
105. The abbreviation is derived from the observation that this particular aspect of the
standard is the "third" category of "joint criminal enterprise" addressed in the Tadic decision.
106. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 228 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 15, 1999).
107. Id. 1 220.
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concludes that a "person who orders an act or omission with the aware-
ness of the substantial ikelihood that a crime will be committed in the
execution of that order, has the requisite mens rea for establishing
liability." 0 8
If these three specific, limited contexts for which ICTYjurisprudence
concludes that recklessness is a sufficient mens rea to support a criminal
prosecution are considered alone, the general assertion from Rule 156 of
the ICRC CIHL study that "war crimes are violations that are committed"
intentionally or recklessly is misleading and erroneous. Rather than such
a broad assertion involving "war crimes" generally, these three categories
of cases support the assertion that war crimes may be committed "reck-
lessly" in specific, limited circumstances. A more accurate assertion, at
least involving these three categories of ICTY cases, would be:
Recklessness is included in the spectrum of mens rea for war
crimes in specific, limited contexts. The first is the war crime of
murder in the detention context when a detainee dies as a
result of serious bodily injury inflicted with reckless disregard
of human life. The second involves a joint criminal enterprise
when the defendant willingly participates in the criminal enter-
prise, a criminal act other than the one agreed upon in the
common plan is committed, and commission of the "other"
crime was foreseeable and the defendant willingly took that
risk. The third involves command responsibility when a person
who orders an act or omission does so with the awareness of a
substantial likelihood that a grave breach or serious violation
will be committed in the execution of that order.
This example rule is rather more limited in scope than the general reck-
lessness assertion reflected in Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study. However,
this example rule is a considerably more faithful and accurate application
of the "international case-law" of the ICTY involving recklessness on the
spectrum of mens rea that is sufficient to support a prosecution for war
crimes. As the next section describes, the detainee abuse example is the
only one of these three that goes on to be reflected explicitly"e in the text
of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.
108. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, AppealsJudgment, ¶ 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 29, 2004).
109. Detainee abuse offenses are reflected in the Rome Statute regardless of whether the
detainee dies from the abuse. Inflicting serious injury in this context is sufficient to qualify as a
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What, then, of the context that could ostensibly support a general
assertion related to recklessness and war crimes such as that reflected
in Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study? The applicable offense, in the
general targeting context, is the war crime of making civilian objects,
individual civilians, or the civilian population the object of attack. A
plain text reading of the Galit recklessness test certainly indicates that
recklessness hould be included on the mens rea spectrum in the gen-
eral targeting context. However, the careful evaluation conducted supra
of the GaliW recklessness test reveals two fundamental flaws that render
the mens rea articulation defective. First, the GaliW trial chamber refers
to the questionable "wilfulness" description in the ICRC Commentary
to AP I and simply "accepts this explanation" as valid with no critical
assessment of the conclusion therein. Second, neither the GaliW opin-
ion nor any subsequent ICTY opinion adopting the Gali recklessness
test actually applies the test to conclude that "recklessly" attacking civil-
ians constitutes a war crime.
All such cases, including Gali, involve conduct that is determined to
constitute deliberately targeting civilians. Whether a "reckless" attack that
results in incidental damage to civilian persons and/or objects would
qualify as a war crime is a matter that is not actually addressed in the juris-
prudence of the ICTY. Rather, the factual foundations for which the tri-
bunal has occasion to adjudicate offenses in a general targeting context,
such as the sustained and indiscriminate attack against Sarajevo, are
found to be deliberate attacks against the civilian population. As such,
these attacks qualify for the much higher mens rea categories of purpose-
ful or dolus directus in the first degree or, at the very least, knowing or dolus
directus in the second degree. Due to the absence of application to an
actual qualifying factual scenario and to the dubious nature of the ICRC
explanation the founding Gali decision accepts with no critical analysis,
including recklessness on the spectrum of mens rea that is sufficient to
support a war crime in the general targeting context is not supportable.
The ICTY is, of course, not the only relevant source of "international
case-law" to consult in the present inquiry. This is so notwithstanding
that the recklessness assertion reflected in Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL
study cites only to the ICTY-and to only one opinion from the ICTY. A
separate source of international criminal law, jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Court,110 is examined in the next section before
war crime, irrespective of whether the detainee later dies from the injuries that were inflicted with
"reckless disregard of human life" as the Delalicform of "recklessness" would permit.
110. The ICC is certainly not the only other important source of relevant international
criminaljurisprudence. The post-World War II war crimes tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and hybrid tribunals such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
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consolidating the substantive aspect of the recklessness assertion and
transitioning to the procedural inquiry.
F. "International Case-Law" and the International Criminal Court
The ICTY represents an important source of "international case-law"
because, among other reasons, it established the precedent for the re-
vival of international criminal law after a period of dormancy that
began when the post-World War II war crimes tribunals ended. The
establishment of the ICTY and the judicial opinions that emanated
from the tribunal provide a rich collection of sources to be considered
by its contemporary ad hoc tribunal, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the international and internationalized tri-
bunals that followed. Among the successors of the ICTY, one source of
international criminal jurisprudence stands alone as the only perma-
nent tribunal and the only international criminal tribunal established
directly by a vast collection of states: the International Criminal Court.
The process by which the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
established is considered in greater detail while examining the proce-
dural aspect of the recklessness assertion in Part Two. For the present
inquiry involving the substantive aspect, however, two matters involving
the ICC are particularly relevant. The first is the provisions of the
founding Rome Statute involving the requisite mens rea for criminal
offenses established by the treaty, and the second is relevant judicial
opinions of the ICC that explore the contours of these mens rea
provisions.
The central mens rea component of the Rome Statute is established
by Article 30, which specifies the "mental element" that is required for
all crimes reflected in the treaty "unless otherwise provided.""' This
required mental element requires both "intent" and "knowledge," again
"unless otherwise provided" by a specific offense."2 While there is no
further explanation for the "knowledge" requirement, "intent" is con-
sidered differently based on whether the specific offense involves con-
duct or a consequence. For conduct, a person "has intent" when the
person "means to engage in the conduct.""3 For a consequence
Cambodia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, among others, constitute other important
sources. The establishment of and judicial opinions from these sources are considered at relevant
points infra in Part Two. For the present analysis of the substantive aspect of the recklessness
assertion, however, these sources are of limited utility and are therefore not addressed.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 30(1).
112. Id.
113. Id. art. 30(2).
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offense, a person "has intent" when the person "means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events.""4 Based on this formulation, the mental element can be
understood to establish "knowledge" as a baseline requirement, while
"intent" constitutes an additional requirement the specifics of which
depend on whether the offense in question involves "conduct" or a
consequence.
With knowledge as a baseline requirement for all offenses addressed
by the Rome Statute, recklessness and the related concept of dolus even-
tualis are specifically excluded from the required mental element
unless otherwise provided by a specific offense. This specific exclusion
is no accident. As Roger Clark observes on the matter while reflecting
on his experience as a delegate at the Rome Conference, "dolus eventua-
lis and its common law cousin, recklessness, suffered banishment by
consensus" during negotiations for the Rome Statute."5 Regarding the
reasoning for the exclusion, Donald Piragoff and Darryl Robinson
recall from their experience at the Rome Conference that delegates
expressed concern that including recklessness or dolus eventualis in the
general mental element provision of Article 30 "might send the wrong
signal that these forms of culpability were sufficient for criminal liability
as a general rule."" 6
In the absence of consensus in relation to adding recklessness to
Article 30, the delegates negotiating the Rome Statute "decided to leave
the incorporation of such mental states of culpability in individual
articles that defined specific crimes or modes of responsibility."1 1 7 This
decision to exclude recklessness or dolus eventualis from the general
mental element was taken notwithstanding consideration of extensive
studies performed by the ICRC and submitted to the preparatory com-
mittee for the Rome Statute asserting that recklessness should be
included. One such study asserts as a general observation "relevant to
all offenses" described in the study that the "notion 'wilful' includes
'intent' and 'recklessness"'1 18 and makes the same assertion in relation
114. Id. art. 30(2) (b).
115. Roger S. Clark, Drafting a General Part to a Penal Code: Some Thoughts Inspired by the
Negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and by the Court's First Substantive
Law Discussion in the Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation Proceedings, 19 CRIM. L.F. 519, 529 (2008).
116. Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE
850 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
117. Id.
118. ICRC, Paper Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross on article 8, paragraph 2(b)
(viii), (x), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xxi), (xxii) and (xxvi), of the Statute of the International Criminal
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to several specific offenses.1"9 A related study submitted by the ICRC to
the preparatory committee makes similar assertions regarding reckless-
ness and war crimes, but in relation to the offense of "intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such" and similar tar-
geting offenses.1'20
Consistent with these assertions by the ICRC, an early proposal for
what would go on to become the Rome Statute included recklessness in
the general mental element. The text of this draft indicates that for any
specific crime that indicates the offense may be committed "recklessly,"
this component of the mental element is satisfied when a person "is
aware of a risk that the circumstance exists or that the consequence will
occur," the person "is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to
take," and the person "is indifferent to the possibility that the circum-
stance exists or that the consequence will occur."'2' This early formula-
tion of recklessness in the mental element is consistent with the
observations reflected in the ICRC papers submitted to the preparatory
committee. It is also consistent, incidentally, with the recklessness for-
mulation derived by the ICTY Galit trial chamber opinion. However,
none of the individual, specific offenses that emerged from negotia-
tions include reference to recklessness, so that aspect of the proposed
mental state article was dropped from the treaty as superfluous.122
Court, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2, Annex I, at 11 (July 14, 1999), www.legal-tools.org/doc/
d8ff04/pdf.
119. See, e.g., id. at 16-24 (in relation to subjecting a detainee to physical mutilation or to
medical or scientific experiments), 24-33 (in relation to destroying or seizing the enemy's
property unless such is demanded by the necessities of war), 40-46 (in relation to pillage), 46-49
(in relation to committing outrages upon personal dignity), 49-57 (in relation to rape and other
forms of sexual assault), 69-75 (generally, in relation to "violations of Common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions"), 76 (in relation to murder of all kinds), 78 (in relation to cruel
treatment), 83 (in relation to committing outrages upon personal dignity), 87 (in relation to
taking hostages), 121-22 (generally, in relation to "other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character").
120. See ICRC, Paper Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross on article 8, paragraph 2
(e), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (ix) and (x), of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, PCNICC/
1999/WGEC/INF/2/Add.3, Annex, at 7 (Nov. 24, 1999), www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc889c/pdf.
121. G.A., Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (VOL. II), at 92 (1996).
122. See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 205 (Roy Lee ed.
1999); U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (VOL. II), 132 (2002) (summarizing
the recommendation of Mr. Saland, delegate from Sweden, to delete the reference to
recklessness in the general mental element article since recklessness is "a concept which
appeared nowhere else in the Statute and was therefore superfluous") [hereinafter II Rome
Conference Official Records].
[Vol. 5234
RECKLESSNESS, INTENT, AND WAR CRIMES
Despite extensive advocacy by the ICRC in favor of including reckless-
ness as a component of the general mental element, then, the state del-
egates that negotiated the Rome Statute rejected recklessness and the
related dolus eventualis.
If the text of the Rome Statute is compared with the four specific cat-
egories in which recklessness is described as part of the mens rea spec-
trum for war crimes in ICTYjurisprudence, the analysis reveals that two
of the four categories are reflected in some form in the text of the treaty
while two categories are rejected. The Delalit category of recklessness,
involving murder of a detainee by inflicting serious injury in "reckless
disregard of human life," is incorporated in provisions of the Rome
Statute involving humane treatment for detainees. Whether or not the
detainee dies from the serious bodily injury, a defendant can face pros-
ecution for "[w]ilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health"2" against a person "protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention" in an international armed conflict. 2 4
Similarly, in the context of a non-international armed conflict, a de-
fendant can face prosecution for inflicting "[v]iolence to life and per-
son, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture."25 In the Delalit "recklessness" context, the accused at least
knowingly, if not purposefully, inflicts serious bodily injury upon a
detainee; recklessness is only a factor in a charge of murder if the
detainee later dies of the injuries that were inflicted in "reckless disre-
gard of human life." 26 Pursuant o the Rome Statute, the act of "wilfully
causing great suffering" in an international armed conflict (IAC) or
inflicting "violence to life and person" in a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC) qualifies as a war crime regardless of whether the
detainee dies from the injuries. As such, the conduct that underpins
the Delalit recklessness test is incorporated into the Rome Statute.
123. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 8(2) (a) (iii), which corresponds to the identical grave
breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and applies, by the terms of Common Article
2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by the terms of the Rome Statute, only in the context of
an international armed conflict (an armed conflict between "High Contracting Parties" to the
1949 Geneva Conventions).
124. Id. art. 8(2). It is worth noting that, in this context and contrary to what seems to have
developed as a general colloquial usage, a "protected person" is a term of art that addresses
specifically the wounded and sick in the field (GC I), the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea
(GC II), prisoners of war (itself a defined term, addressed by GC III), and civilians in occupied
territory (itself a defined term, addressed by GC IV).
125. Id. art. 8(2) (c) (i), which corresponds to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
126. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 439 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
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The same is arguably true in the context of the BlasWki "recklessness"
component of command responsibility. A plain reading of the individ-
ual criminal responsibility provision of the Rome Statute excludes the
BlaskiW category of recklessness since the Rome Statute provision per-
mits individual criminal responsibility for a commander who "[o]rders,
solicits or induces the commission" of a crime reflected in Article 5 of
the treaty.1 17 This ground for individual criminal responsibility is more
limited than the BlaskiW recklessness category since the BlaskiW reckless-
ness formulation permits individual responsibility for a commander if
she issues an order "with the awareness of the substantial ikelihood"1 2 8
that subordinates will commit a serious offense in carrying out that
order.
However, factual scenarios that would qualify for BlaskiW recklessness
are arguably incorporated in the command/superior responsibility
provision of the Rome Statute. The relevant provisions of the Rome
Statute permit criminal responsibility for a commander who "should
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit"
crimes reflected in the Rome Statute and "who failed to take all neces-
sary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress" the commission of the crimes.129 A person in a position of
authority, but who does not qualify as a "commander," can be subjected
to superior responsibility for the offenses of subordinates on similar
grounds.130
This mode of responsibility arguably qualifies for the Blasit category
of recklessness since a commander who "should have known" that sub-
ordinates were committing or about to commit a grave breach or seri-
ous violation would likely be found to be aware "of the substantial
likelihood" that the subordinates would do so. In at least one respect,
the Rome Statute version of command recklessness arguably expands
upon Blaski recklessness because the Blaskit test involves reckless orders,
while the Rome Statute corollary just involves information the com-
mander "should have known," regardless of whether the commander
herself issued an order. The BlaskiW category of recklessness, then, is
arguably reflected in the Rome Statute, though not in exactly the same
textual form that is extracted from ICTYjurisprudence.
127. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 25(3) (b).
128. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, AppealsJudgment, ¶ 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 29, 2004).
129. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 28(a). It is worth noting that the commander can be
insulated from command responsibility for the crimes by submitting the matter to competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
130. See id. art. 28(b).
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One category of recklessness reflected in ICTY jurisprudence
that is excluded from the Rome Statute is the "reckless" aspect of
joint criminal enterprise described in TadW. Again, TadW reckless-
ness, reflected in the so-called JCE III category, permits criminal
liability of a person who knowingly participates in a joint criminal
enterprise when the group commits an offense the defendant did
not intend but was foreseeable.131 This style of recklessness is ex-
plicitly excluded from the Rome Statute provision involving indi-
vidual criminal responsibility. In the context of a joint criminal
enterprise, the Rome Statute only recognizes individual responsi-
bility for participants "in the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit" a crime that is addressed by the treaty."'
Regarding the fourth category of recklessness addressed by the juris-
prudence of the ICTY, the Gali recklessness test involving the general tar-
geting context is also explicitly excluded by the Rome Statute. This result
is mandated by applying the Article 30 mental element to the list of poten-
tial offenses involved in the targeting context. These offenses are, in
essence, general or specific articulations of the LOAC distinction rule
and, in the case of an IAC, of the proportionality rule. In the context of
an IAC, the general articulation of the distinction rule prohibits "[i]nten-
tionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities"133 and "[i]nten-
tionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are
not military objectives."3 4 In the NIAC context, the same prohibition
is reflected as to civilian persons3" but not in general as to civilian
objects.136 Articulations of the distinction rule as it applies to specific cate-
gories of persons and objects are reflected in both the IAC137 and the
131. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, AppealsJudgment, ¶ 228 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former YugoslaviaJuly 15, 1999).
132. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 25(3) (d) (ii) (emphasis added). For additional details
regarding the exclusion ofJCE III from the Rome Statute, see Heller, supra note 104.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 8(2) (b) (i).
134. Id. art. 8(2) (b) (ii).
135. Id. art. 8(e) (i).
136. See id. art. 8(e).
137. See id. art. 8(b) (iii) (involving intentionally directing an attack against persons or objects
involved in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping operations); art. 8(b) (ix) (involving
intentionally directing an attack against medical facilities or buildings of specified cultural
importance); art. 8(b) (xxiv) (involving intentionally directing attacks directing attacks against
personnel, places, and equipment using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law).
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NIAC' 38 contexts, though there are minor differences in the coverage
of the two contexts.
None of the articulations of the distinction rule reflected in the
Rome Statute would explicitly permit criminal liability pursuant to the
ICTY Galit recklessness tandard. As described supra, the Galit reckless-
ness formulation incorporates a questionable ICRC assertion that the
requisite mens rea for war crimes "encompasses the concepts of 'wrong-
ful intent' or 'recklessness', viz., the attitude of an agent who, without
being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happen-
ing."1 39 As the analysis above explains, the Galit trial chamber simply
"accepts this explanation""' with no critical analysis and applies the ex-
planation to a targeting scenario: a sustained campaign of deliberate
and indiscriminate attacks against Sarajevo.
Application of the Galit line of cases to the Rome Statute further
erodes the validity of the recklessness standard described by the Galit
trial chamber. This is so because all the defendants in the ICTY cases
that apply the Galit recklessness test at least knowingly-and likely
purposefully-directed attacks against the civilian population as such.
This conduct would qualify as "intentional" pursuant to the mental ele-
ment established in Article 30 of the Rome Statute and as a war crime
pursuant to specific applications of the LOAC distinction rule. However,
the test described by the Galit trial chamber, which is based on the ques-
tionable ICRC mens rea explanation asserting that recklessness is "part
and parcel" of willfulness, is explicitly rejected by the Rome Statute.
The text of the Rome Statute is a fundamental feature of "interna-
tional case-law" on the topic because the treaty describes the law that
the judges of the various chambers are expected to apply. However, ju-
dicial decisions applying that text are, of course, also central to the in-
quiry. An early ICC judicial opinion indicated that there may be scope
for expanding the requisite mental element to include something akin
to dolus eventualis,4 ' and this development generated a degree of
138. See id. art. 8(e) (ii) (involving intentionally directing an attack against persons or objects
marked with distinctive emblems recognized pursuant to international law as medical facilities or
personnel); art. 8(e) (iii) (involving intentionally directing an attack against persons or objects
involved in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping operations); art. 8(e)(iv) (involving
intentionally directing an attack against medical facilities or buildings of specified cultural
importance).
139. See ICRC Commentary, supra note 54, ¶ 3474.
140. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, TrialJudgement, ¶ 54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
141. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
¶ 352 (Jan. 29, 2007) (concluding that the general volitional element, in addition to dolus directus
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positive response among scholars.142 However, subsequent judicial
opinions have clarified that the correct interpretation of Article 30
mandates that recklessness and the related dolus eventualis are excluded
from the requisite mental element "unless otherwise provided" by the
text of a specific offense and the elements established for the specific
offense.1'43
None of the war crimes reflected in Article 8 of the Rome Statute ex-
plicitly permit a mens rea lower on the spectrum than that established
by Article 30. However, the Elements of Crimes permit criminal liability
for a perpetrator who "knew or should have known" of a particular cir-
cumstance in relation to specific war crimes. These include offenses
such as improper use of a flag of truce,144 improper use of a flag, insig-
nia or uniform of the hostile party,145 improper use of the distinctive
emblem of the Geneva Conventions,' and using, conscripting, or
enlisting children.
Although a plain reading of the text of the Rome Statute suggests
that recklessness is excluded from the mental element that is applicable
to war crimes (and other offenses), there is no shortage of suggestions
in literature on the topic for ways that the mental element could be
expanded to include recklessness. One such imaginative suggestion is
to expand upon a risk formulation derived by the Lubanga trial cham-
ber to conclude that if a person "knows there is a high risk and he
nevertheless goes ahead and acts, he can fairly be said to have 'willed'
in the first and second degrees, includes "situations in which the suspect (a) is aware of the risk
that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, and (b)
accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it (also known
as dolus eventualis") ).
142. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake ofLaw, and Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Decision
on Confirmation of Charges, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 471, 482-83 (2008) (citing GERHARD WERLE,
VOLKERSTRAFRECHT (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the Lubanga PTC mental element discussion and
observing that "the Court's more expansive interpretation of that clause certainly makes
theoretical and political sense")).
143. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision of the Trial Chamber, 1 1011
(Mar. 14, 2012) (observing that analysis of the drafting history of the Rome Statute "suggests that
the notion of dolus eventualis, along with the concept of recklessness, was deliberately excluded
from the framework of the Statute (e.g. see the use of the words 'unless otherwise provided' in the
first sentence of Article 30")); Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Charges
of the Prosecutor, 11 367, 369 (June 15, 2009).
144. The Elements of Crimes, INT'L CRIM. COURT art. 8(2) (b) (vii)-1 (2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf.
145. Id. art. 8(2) (b) (vii)-2.
146. Id. art. 8(2) (b) (vii)-4.
147. Id. art. 8(2) (b) (xxvi) (in the context of an IAC), art. 8(2) (e) (vii) (in the context of a
NIAC).
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the consequence."" This suggestion speculates that "Article 30(2) (b) ...
is at least a useful prop to support" such a risk-based formulation.149
However, the Lubanga appeals chamber goes on to reject the trial cham-
ber interpretation upon which this suggestion seeks to expand. In fact,
the Lubanga appeals chamber opinion characterizes the risk-based
approach derived by the trial chamber as "confusing" and concludes
that "reference to 'risk' should have been avoided when interpreting ar-
ticle 30 (2) of the Statute."150
Yet another such proposal for expanding the Rome Statute mental
element suggests a creative combination of the "unless otherwise pro-
vided" clause of Article 30 with the provision of the Rome Statute per-
mitting application of "principles and rules of international law."151
This inventive proposal could, according to the suggestion, permit
incorporation of judicial opinions from, for example, the ad hoc tribu-
nals, to define terms such as "wilfull" and "wanton" that are borrowed
from existing international law treaties and incorporated into the
Rome Statute.1 2 A related, though less nuanced, observation bypasses
the "unless otherwise provided" clause altogether and suggests direct
incorporation of explanations of terms such as "wilfully" that have "con-
sistently been interpreted by the ICTY "1 53
Creative proposals such as these for expanding upon the mental ele-
ment established by the Rome Statute share a common perspective:
that the mental element reflected in the plain text of the Rome Statute
is inconsistent with customary international law as it exists beyond the
four corners of the treaty. This is especially true of suggestions that pur-
port to incorporate seemingly preferable jurisprudence of the ad hoc tri-
bunals, particularly of the ICTY. The role of international criminal
tribunals as a source of customary international law is the primary focus
148. Weigend, supra note 142, at 483.
149. Id.
150. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, AppealsJudgement, ¶ 449 (Dec. 1, 2014).
151. See Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 21(1) (b).
152. See Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Unless Othenvise Provided: Article 30 of the ICC
Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 35, 53
(2005) (asserting that a "main source of subjective conditions of liability under customary
international law is the jurisprudence of the" ad hoc tribunals and assessing examples in which the
tribunals determine that recklessness is "sufficient to meet the requirements of the mental
element of several" specific crimes).
153. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAw, MODES OF LIABILITY AND THE
MENTAL ELEMENT: ANALYZING THE EARLYJURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 74-
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of Part II. For now, it is sufficient to point out that these suggestions for
expanding on the mental element established in the Rome Statute are
inconsistent with the unambiguous intent of the state representatives
who negotiated the text of the Rome Statute and of the states that ulti-
mately ratified the treaty.
While certainly inventive, the suggestion that opinions from the ad
hoc tribunals can be incorporated directly into the Rome Statute to clar-
ify the meaning of seemingly ambiguous terms such as "wilful" and
"wanton" constitutes a misapplication of provisions of the treaty
designed to prevent assimilation of sources outside the treaty. Outside
absorption of this sort is prohibited unless the text of the treaty itself is
found to be ambiguous and in need of clarification.1"' Careful consid-
eration reveals that while some relevant underlying terms present a cer-
tain degree of vagueness, the Rome Statute itself does not.
It is undoubtedly true that terms such as willful and wanton are them-
selves ambiguous. Such terms are vestiges of central international law
instruments dating back at least to the venerable Lieber Code, and in
most cases the relevant instruments do not themselves clarify the mean-
ings.155 As Roger Clark recalls from his experience with drafting the
Rome Statute, many of those involved in the process "tended to fall
back on" what he describes as "'the previously agreed language' princi-
ple of international drafting."'56 As Clark explains the perspective of
such participants:
[I]f the diplomats assembled at The Hague in 1907 (or in some
other significant negotiation) used certain words, there is a
strong presumption against changing them, lest "settled" law
become "unsettled"! Thus, in the special part [which includes
the enumerated offenses], in addition to what appear to the
154. See Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 21.
155. See, e.g., General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 44 (Apr. 24, 1863) ("All wanton violence committed
against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the
authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all
rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of
death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense")
(emphasis added); Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (describing the offense of, among
others, "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity" as a war crime) [hereinafter IMT Statute]; GC III, supra note 69, art. 130 (replicating
the grave breach provisions of the other three 1949 Geneva Conventions and describing the
offense of, among others, "wilful killing" as a grave breach of GC III).
156. Clark, supra note 13, at 314.
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casual reader to be random uses of the word "intentionally",
one also finds words like "wilful", "wanton", "calculated" and
"treacherously", along with some awkward uses of "unlawfully"
that make life difficult in terms of applying either a specific use
or a default rule. Because what was "settled" in respect of words
like these turned out to be much disputed, an effort had to be
made in drafting the Elements to tackle some of these issues.157
While long-standing precedent supports the inclusion of offenses
such as "wilful" killing and "wanton" destruction among the war crimes
enumerated in the Rome Statute, the legacy of legal instruments from
which such terms are drawn does not specifically define these funda-
mental mens rea principles. Cautious commitment to "settled" law led
the delegates involved in the Rome process to adopt the specific,
though ambiguous, legacy terminology. The broad principles are set-
tled law, even if some specific, underlying meaning is not.
Nonetheless, the ambiguity that is inherent in seemingly central
mens rea terms such as "wilful" or "wanton" is of little consequence in
relation to the treaty the judges of the ICC are obligated to apply.
Whatever it means to "willfully" kill a victim or "wantonly" destroy prop-
erty that does not qualify as a military objective, at least one thing is ir-
refutable: these seemingly ambiguous terms describe conduct of an
alleged perpetrator. While the text of the Rome Statute invites a cer-
tain degree of ambiguity by adopting legacy mens rea terminology
with no settled meaning, the universal mental element is unequivo-
cal. Whether the offense is "wilful" killing, "wanton" destruction, or
"intentionally" directing attacks against civilians, "intent and knowl-
edge" are required1 58 and the perpetrator must "mean to"159 engage
in the proscribed conduct.
On this application, the text of the Rome Statute is unambiguous,
even if that is not the case for some of the legacy mens rea terminology
incorporated by specific offenses. Article 30 functions as a closed door
to explicitly exclude incorporation of interpretations of ambiguous leg-
acy terms from outside sources rather than as an open window to invite
and assimilate them. Inventive suggestions to smuggle in outside inter-
pretations to "clarify" such legacy terminology are misguided, no mat-
ter how well-intentioned.
157. Id.
158. Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 30(1).
159. Id. art. 30(2) (a).
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Such suggestions are directed at an ambiguity that does not exist
because the vague terms they seek to clarify all constitute conduct, and
in applying the universal mental element the Rome Statute is unequivo-
cal. The "unless otherwise provided" clause of Article 30, then, calls for
an internal assessment of the treaty and the Elements rather than an
endeavor to canvass external explanations of varying trustworthiness.
With neither the treaty nor the Elements providing otherwise, there is
nothing to alter the default "intent and knowledge" requirement in
relation to proscribed conduct such as "wilful" killing, "wanton" destruc-
tion, or "intentionally directing attacks" against civilian persons or
objects.
This restrictivist conclusion is further supported by applying provi-
sions of the Rome Statute involving identification of the applicable law.
While the Court may consider and apply "established principles of the
international law of armed conflict," this authorization applies only in
"the second place."16 The degree to which a questionable interpreta-
tion for "wilful" by the ICRC and a line of ICTY cases that "accepts this
explanation" with no critical analysis while not actually applying it in
practice constitutes an "established" principle of international law is de-
batable. What is indisputable is that the court is obliged to apply the
text of the Rome Statute and the Elements in "the first place."161 Absent
ambiguity regarding whether "wilful" killing, "wanton" destruction, or
"intentionally directing attacks" against civilians constitute conduct, or
absent an internal provision of the treaty or Elements providing other-
wise, the assertion that recklessness or dolus eventualis are included in
the universal mental element is simply unsustainable.
In case there is any remaining room for doubt, the provision of the
Rome Statute addressing the legality principle (nullum crimen sine lege)
removes any remaining vestiges of uncertainty. Simply put, "[t]he defi-
nition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended
by analogy."1" Inviting external interpretations of ambiguous terminol-
ogy involving conduct, for which operation of Article 30(1) and Article
30(2) (a) of the Rome Statute unequivocally establish the required
interpretation, is the opposite of strictly construing the mental element
that applies to all offenses unless otherwise provided by the treaty or
the Elements.
Likewise, construing "intent" to include "recklessness" based on an
explanation by the ICRC that is accepted (but not applied) by the ICTY
160. Id. art. 21(1) (b).
161. Id. art. 21(1) (a).
162. Id. art. 22(2).
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constitutes extending the mental element by analogy to the interpreta-
tions of these external sources. Such an extension would be even more
implausible considering that the assertion reflected in the ICRC
Commentary, which the Gali trial chamber accepts without critical
scrutiny, is itself founded upon an extension by analogy. As examined
supra, the analogy reflected in the ICRC AP I Commentary6'6 is the du-
bious assertion that "wilful" in the context of "making the civilian popu-
lation or individual civilians the object of attack" reflected in Article 85
of AP I is conceptually and legally synonymous with a "wilful act or omis-
sion which seriously endangers the physical or mental health or integ-
rity of any person who is in the power of a Party" reflected in Article 11
of AP I.
This analogy constitutes a category error in that the two contexts, tar-
geting and detainee abuse, are conceptually and factually distinct-not
to mention that the analogy rests on a translation ambiguity, as also
examined above. If extending definitions by analogy is prohibited by
operation of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute, it would seem that
doing so by incorporating a principle that itself is founded on an anal-
ogy is doubly forbidden. In any event, operation of the legality principle
requires definitions to be strictly construed and proscribes extending
definitions by analogy. The proposal to stretch Article 30 of the Rome
Statute to accommodate recklessness, while creative, fails on both
counts.
As examined infra in the analysis for Part Two, the text of the Rome
Statute constitutes an extraordinarily persuasive customary prescription
of grave breaches and serious violations of international law, namely
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.1" This persuasive-
ness extends to the mental element prescription that applies, unless
otherwise provided, to all offenses reflected in the Rome Statute.
Excluding the Rome Statute and the judicial opinions that apply the
text of the treaty from an examination of "international case-law" would
defy logic. Careful evaluation of the treaty and judicial opinions that
apply the treaty comprehensively repudiates the assertion that reck-
lessness or dolus eventualis are included on the spectrum of mens rea
applicable for war crimes to be adjudicated by the International
Criminal Court. As such, consideration of the ICC as a component of
163. See ICRC Commentary, supra note 54, ¶ 3474.
164. For reasons that are beyond the scope of the present inquiry, I consider that there is
reason to doubt the customary status of the provisions of the Rome Statute involving the war
crime of employing "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body" (art. 8(2) (b)
(xix)) and the crime of aggression (art. 8 bis).
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"international case-law" renders the already dubious recklessness
assertion as it applies to the ICTY even more implausible.
G. Consolidating the Substantive Aspect
After examining in detail relevant "international case-law" from the
ICTY and ICC, the general substantive observation that "international
case-law has indicated" that war crimes can be committed "intention-
ally" or "recklessly" is not sustainable. One of the most glaring inad-
equacies of this general conclusion is that the assertion treats in unitary
fashion the factual scenarios that purport to apply recklessness.
Murdering a detainee by inflicting serious bodily injury in "reckless"
disregard of human life, as in the Delalic variety of recklessness, consti-
tutes a separate factual and conceptual scenario than being "reckless"
in a targeting context, as in Gali. Both are factually and conceptually
different from the Tadi variety of "recklessness" involving JCE III. All
three are factually and conceptually distinct from the BlaskiW variety
involving command responsibility. The circumstances in which reck-
lessness might be considered do not constitute a unitary factual or con-
ceptual framework. The merits of each category must be evaluated
separately, as must the development and continued applicability of
each.
Combining all these varieties into a consolidated conclusion that
"international case-law has indicated" that recklessness in generalis suffi-
cient for a war crimes prosecution is misleading. Three varieties-
Delalic, Blaski, and Tadi-are themselves limited subsets of general
categories of conduct for which recklessness is sufficient. While the
GaliW variety is of broader application, recklessness in this context is
invoked as a method of objectively assessing the subjective claim of a
defendant-and this brand is never actually applied to conclude that
"recklessly" targeting civilians is a war crime. As such, drawing the
conclusion that "international case-law has indicated" that war crimes
can be committed recklessly is inaccurate without significant limita-
tions. It is certainly inadequate to assert, as the ICRC CIHL study
does, that the Delalic variety of recklessness, which involves the spe-
cific context of murdering a detainee by inflicting serious injury in
reckless disregard of human life, supports the conclusion that war
crimes in generalcan be committed recklessly.
Perhaps an even more grievous deficiency of the general assertion
that "international case-law has indicated" that recklessness is sufficient
is that it does not consider developments that have occurred since the
founding opinions of the ICTY have so indicated in specific, limited
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circumstances. As examined supra, the Delalit category of recklessness
derived by the ICTY does carry over to the statute for the ICC and is
reflected as a war crime in the Rome Statute. The Tadit recklessness va-
riety involving JCE III is excluded from the text of the Rome Statute.
Although the Blaskit variety of recklessness involving command respon-
sibility seems to be excluded by the text of the Rome Statute, this variety
may be indirectly applicable depending on the specific factual scenario
involved in a particular case.
As for the assertion that recklessness is a viable component on the
spectrum of mens rea applicable for war crimes in the general targeting
context pursuant to the jurisprudence of international criminal tribu-
nals, the contention simply does not withstand scrutiny. This particular
form of recklessness is based on a questionable ICRC explanation that
was accepted by the GalitICTY trial chamber with no critical assessment
and never actually applied in practice to conclude that recklessness is
sufficient.1' This form of recklessness was later explicitly discarded by
the state delegates that negotiated the Rome Statute. Despite an early
ICC judicial opinion indicating that there may be room for expanding
the mental element reflected in the treaty to include recklessness or
dolus eventualis, subsequent ICC jurisprudence has explicitly rejected
this possibility." Based on a close and detailed inspection, continuing
to assert that "international case-law" indicates that recklessness or the
related dolus eventualis are included on the spectrum of mens rea appli-
cable for war crimes in a general targeting context is, at the very best,
ill-informed.
The inquiry thus far has been confined to the substantive aspect
of the recklessness assertion-exploring whether "international case-
law" truly does indicate, in general, that recklessness is a sufficient
mens rea to support a war crimes prosecution as a matter of customary
international law. While the answer to that inquiry is a resounding
"no," this investigation does not address a fundamental issue with
much broader implications. From a procedural perspective, what is the
role of "international case-law"-or, to be more precise, the jurispru-
dence of international criminal tribunals-as a source of customary
international law? That role, and the relationship between interna-
tional criminal tribunals and states, provides the central focus for Part
Two.
165. See supra Section III.D.1.
166. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra
note 141; Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision of the Trial Chamber, supra note 143.
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IV. PART Two: PROCEDURAL ASSESSMENT AND THE "DESIGNATE AND EXTEND"
MODEL
The conclusion that "international case-law" indicates that reckless-
ness is a component of the mens rea for war crimes only in specific, lim-
ited circumstances as a matter of customary international law is useful
in relation to that specific substantive matter. While this substantive
conclusion is important in the context of characterizing and adjudicat-
ing offenses that occur during armed conflict, the recklessness question
implicates an issue of much broader concern. If assertions that reckless-
ness is sufficient as a matter of customary international law frequently,
perhaps even exclusively, rely on jurisprudence of international crimi-
nal tribunals for support, the presently unsettled role of these tribunals
as a source of international law must be established. Clarifying that role
and the relationship between international criminal tribunals and
states is the central endeavor for Part Two.
Although Rule 156 of the ICRC CIHL study invites this procedural
matter by relying exclusively on "international case-law" in support of
the recklessness assertion, the ICRC is not alone. For example, in
criticizing the implied conclusion of the U.S. military following the
Kunduz airstrike that recklessness is excluded from the mens rea spec-
trum applicable for war crimes, Adhil Ahmad Haque points exclusively
to jurisprudence from the ICTY as evidence of customary international
law before challenging, "[i]f the [U.S.] Army rejects the ICTY's under-
standing of customary international law then it should explain why."1 67
Haque goes on to explain his understanding that there is no reason to
believe that the "Rome Statute casts doubt on the ICTY's rulings, or per-
haps reflects a narrowing of customary international law."1 68
When addressing the substantive inquiry regarding recklessness and
war crimes, this perspective that judicial opinions from the ICTY func-
tion to establish the parameters of customary international law and
that it is incumbent upon other entities to comply with this "law" is
rather popular. Antonio Cassese, for example, lamenting the Rome
Statute exclusion of recklessness from the mental element for war
crimes, asserts that "current international law must be taken to allow
for recklessness" to be included.169 By failing to comply with "current
167. Haque, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections,
10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 144, 154 (1999). Although Cassese does not refer directly to jurisprudence of
the ICTYin this observation that the Rome Statute should align with "current international law,"
the inference can be drawn from the fact that Cassese was at the time the president of the ICTY
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international law," Cassese concludes that "on this score the Rome
Statute marks a step backwards with respect to lex lata."'7 Knut
Ddrmann, who was then a legal advisor for the ICRC and has been the
Head of the Legal Division for the ICRC since 2007, offered a similar
assessment of the fledgling Rome Statute when he observed, "[i]t will
be up to the future judges of the ICC to bring [ICTY] case law into line
with the [mental element] rule in article 30" of the treaty.'7 '
These and similar observations inspire a host of fundamental ques-
tions that do not appear to have satisfactory answers in the contempo-
rary theory and practice of international law. For example, when it
comes to defining international law, does jurisprudence from the ICTY
truly establish the standard against which other entities should be meas-
ured for compliance? Or should the Rome Statute take precedence
because it is later in time than the statutes for the ad hoc tribunals?
What conclusions should be drawn regarding the status of a particular
"rule" of international law if judicial opinions from the ICTY, for exam-
ple, are inconsistent with those from the ICC or, perhaps, with the
Rome Statute itself? For that matter, how can international criminal tri-
bunals be said to establish international law in the first instance when
this is traditionally considered to be within the exclusive purview of
states?
As the observations and questions above demonstrate, the emer-
gence of contemporary international criminal law, beginning with the
International Military Tribunal and the Subsequent Nuremburg
Proceedings in the aftermath of World War II, has complicated the ca-
nonical role of states as the sole primary source of international law.
What has traditionally been considered the exclusive domain of states
is no longer a matter beyond contestation. After all, before the estab-
lishment of international criminal tribunals, states alone possessed the
authority to adjudicate criminal offenses.
and the factual scenario from which he draws, "shelling a town" while taking a "high and
unjustifiable risk that civilians will be killed," is consistent with a central factual basis for the ICTY
Kupreskit case that was before Cassese's trial chamber when the Article cited by this footnote was
published.
170. Id.
171. Knut Ddrmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a
SpecialFocus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, 7 MAx PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 341, 353 (2003).
The observation from the cited source represents a direct quote from an article Mr. Ddrmann
submitted to the preparatory committee tasked to draft the elements of crimes for the Rome
Statute. See Knut Ddrmann, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: The Elements
of War Crimes, 839 INT'L REV. RED CROSS (Sept. 30, 2000), www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/
documents/article/other/57jqqd.htm.
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The uncertainty regarding the precise relationship between states
and international criminal tribunals evokes the ongoing debate
between the so-called "traditional" and "modern" approaches to catego-
rizing sources of international law. The traditional role of states as the
sole primary source of international law is described in the Statute for
the International Court ofJustice1'7 and has since been famously articu-
lated by the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases opinion of that court173
and, much more recently, been adopted by the International Law
Commission.174 The articulation is so widely recognized that it scarcely
requires recapitulation. However, for the purpose of juxtaposing it
against the emerging so-called "modern" approach, the widely-cited
articulation from the North Sea Continental Shelf opinion observes that
customary international law is derived from a practice that is "extensive
and virtually uniform" among states, particularly those whose "interests
are especially affected," and that states must "show a general recogni-
tion that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved."1 75 According to
this approach, the practice of states constitutes the sole primary source
of customary international law, while judgments of international crimi-
nal tribunals and the writings of highly qualified publicists represent
subsidiary sources.
The perspective that decisions of international criminal tribunals
can be considered as a primary source of law constitutes a two-step
application of the so-called "modern" approach to identifying sour-
ces of international law. The first step is to emphasize the normative
value of one component or the other, general state practice or opinio
juris, of the dual requirements of what proponents describe as the
"traditional" approach. The second step is to characterize opinions
of international criminal tribunals as being on the same footing as
state practice in terms of authority to prescribe rules of customary
law.
This application of the so-called "modern" approach can be appeal-
ing if, for example, there seems to be a relative scarcity of state practice
from which to draw. Cassese, writing an ICTY trial chamber opinion,
implements this approach when canvassing state practice in relation to
reprisals against civilians in armed conflict. Finding no state practice in
172. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 35, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 933.
173. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74
(Feb. 20).
174. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 130
(2018) (specifically Conclusion 2, but generally throughout), https://undocs.org/en/A/73/10.
175. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 173, ¶74.
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favor or against the prohibition,'76 the analysis considers instead what is
deduced to be the opinion of states on the matter.7 7 While the stated
conclusion that extensive and virtually uniform state opinion supports
the prohibition is questionable,'78 the process of emphasizing what is
described as opinio juris at the expense of state practice is a cornerstone
of the so-called "modern" approach to customary international law.
The second step, placing opinions of international criminal tribunals
on equal footing with state practice, is a natural extension of the
endeavor to fill a perceived gap in state practice. In this application,
international criminal tribunals can be characterized as state proxies.
This characterization seems reasonable because legitimacy to adjudi-
cate criminal offenses has heretofore been the sole purview of states,
and by one mechanism or another the tribunals are created by states to
legitimately perform this adjudicative role.
In this context, resorting to opinions of international criminal tribu-
nals to address a perceived scarcity of state practice from which to draw
in articulating rules of customary international law is not the only
appeal. Observations extracted from opinions of international criminal
tribunals can also be alluring if canvassing existing state practice yields
an unpalatable result. As Allison Marston Danner thus contends, "inter-
national judicial lawmaking is particularly appropriate when the under-
lying treaties are anachronistic, and there exists little possibility for
their revision in a diplomatic setting." 17
This purported general expansion beyond the traditional approach
is particularly salient in the specific context of international criminal
law. The ostensive prescriptive function of international criminal tribu-
nals has led to the observation that the "lawmaking process [in interna-
tional law] through judicial interpretation is ongoing at the ad hoc
tribunals and started in 2002 at the ICC."180 Such a "lawmaking" author-
ity is required in the present context if "international case-law" is to be
176. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 527 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former YugoslaviaJan. 14, 2000).
177. See id. ¶ 527-33.
178. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 63 (2012) (citing a scholarly article
and making note of indications of potentially contrary perspectives of the United Kingdom, Italy,
and the United States); OFFICE OF GEN. COUNS., DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 18.18.3.4.
(3d ed. 2016) (citing examples of perspectives of states such as the United Kingdom, Egypt,
Germany, Italy, and France in support of the U.S. perspective that the prohibition against
reprisals reflected in AP I does not constitute a rule of customary international law).
179. Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Trihunals
Recast he Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1, 62 (2006).
180. VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 19, at 4 (emphasis added).
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the sole source relied upon in support of the assertion that recklessness
is a sufficient mens rea to support a war crimes prosecution as a matter
of customary international law. If international criminal tribunals truly
do possess "lawmaking" authority and can purportedly join states as a
primary source of customary international law, how is it that the baton
is passed from states to tribunals? What exactly is the relationship
between international criminal tribunals and states?
In the endeavor to bring clarity to this relationship, the analysis in
Part Two offers a new way to conceptualize the role of international
criminal tribunals. The "designate and extend" model established and
applied herein describes the relationship between states and interna-
tional criminal tribunals and thereby offers a degree of order and
clarity that seems elusive in present scholarship. After exploring the
merits and limitations of the current popular model, the principal-
agent relationship between states and tribunals, the specific contours
of the new designate and extend approach are explained. With the ana-
lytical framework of the designate and extend model described, exist-
ing "international case-law" is applied to the approach in the endeavor
to clarify the role of international criminal tribunals as a source of inter-
national law. Before describing and applying the new approach to con-
ceptualizing the role of international criminal tribunals, the inquiry
turns now to address the prevailing principal-agent model.
A. Principal-Agent Method ofDescribing Relationship Between States and
Tribunals
One popular suggestion for articulating the method by which the
lawmaking baton is passed from states to international criminal tribu-
nals is to consider the tribunals to be delegates exercising judicial
authority on behalf of states. While this is not the only conceptual
model utilized to describe the relationship between states and tribu-
nals,"' the principal-agent relationship is regarded as an obvious truth
in much of the existing literature from scholars' and advocacy
181. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Response: The ICC, Pre-Existing Jurisdictional Treaty Regimes, and the
Limits of the Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Doctrine - A Reply to Michael Newton, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 448 (2016) (describing an omnipresent universal jurisdiction of the ICC that
a state "merely activates" by virtue of ratifying the Rome Statute).
182. See, e.g., Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court: The Paradox of its Authority, in
INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY 331, 335 (Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask
Madsen ed., 2018) (observing that when states ratify the Rome Statute they are "in effect
voluntarily agreeing to delegate authority ... to the ICC" to prosecute the relevant crimes);
Michael A. Newton, How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 371, 374-75 (2016) ("ICC jurisdiction flows exclusively from the delegation of a
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groups.183 The prevalence of this principal-agent model is possibly best
captured by the observation that "[c] onceiving of international courts
in terms of delegating authority [from states] is perhaps the main way
international courts are discussed in the American political science
literature."'
This prevalent model could ostensibly explain the conceptual mech-
anism by which international criminal tribunals become infused with
"lawmaking" authority. If states, as principals, have delegated their
authority to international tribunals, as agents, to allow the tribunals to
exercise judicial authority in situations in which states find it difficult to
do so, perhaps asserting that the decisions of these "agents" represent a
primary source of customary law should be rather uncontroversial. This
would permit, for example, the ICRC to rely solely on "international
case-law" as authority to support the assertion that recklessness is a suffi-
cient mens rea to support a war crimes prosecution.
It is certainly conceptually appealing to characterize the role of
states and international organizations such as the United Nations in
creating international or internationalized tribunals' as delegating
State Party's sovereign jurisdictional power."); Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, The Enforcement of
International Law, in THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 361, 379 (Madeleine O. Hosli & Joren
Selleslaghs ed., 2020) (explaining the "realist's perspective [that] States will delegate authority to
an international institution only if it reflects the balance of powers"); Dapo Akande, The
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 618, 624-25 (2003) ("States have been particularly willing to delegate
jurisdiction in respect of crimes deemed to be of concern to the international community and
where broad jurisdictional measures are needed to prevent and repress those crimes.").
183. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States
(Sept. 2, 2020), www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-court-and-united-
states (describing the premise that states are "simply delegating their authority to prosecute
certain grave crimes committed on their territory to an international court" by ratifying the Rome
Statute as a "basic and well established principle of international law"); Int'l. Comm. of the Red
Cross , Establishment of an International Criminal Court, LG 2000-107-ENG (Oct. 19, 2000), www.icrc.
org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/57jqn4.htm (asserting that there is "no doubt
about the right of a State to delegate" authority to prosecute certain crimes to an "international
tribunal").
184. Karen J. Alter, Do International Courts Enhance Compliance with International Law?, 25 REV.
ASIAN &PAC. STUD., 51, 58-59 (2003).
185. The distinction between "international" such as the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, and
"internationalized" (or "hybrid") tribunals is particularly relevant when considering or assessing
how the different categories of tribunals are formed and pursuant to what legal basis they
function. However, the present inquiry focuses primarily on international (rather than
internationalized) tribunals because of the inherently independent exercise of adjudicative and
enforcement jurisdiction extended to the international tribunals. The procedural significance of
selected hybrid tribunals is examined infra, but the present inquiry is focused predominantly on
international tribunals.
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state authority to such tribunals. After all, international criminal tribu-
nals do carry out an inherent state function by adjudicating allegations
of criminal conduct. Such an arrangement would support the observa-
tion that "international judicial lawmaking may be the truth of interna-
tional politics that cannot be named" because "states simply do not
want to acknowledge that international courts make international
law."'86 This principal-agent model, however, is problematic for at least
three distinct reasons.
The first factor to be addressed here that renders the principal-agent
model conceptually and factually unsatisfactory is the degree of inde-
pendence the "agent" tribunals are expected to exercise after being
established by the "principal" states. The establishing statutes of the
ICTY1 87 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),18 and
ICC,189 for example, of course confirm that it is the tribunal and not
the relevant collection of states that are empowered to adjudicate
offenses brought before the tribunal. A survey of perspectives proffered
by several representatives of states while deliberating establishment of
the ICTY 90 and drafting the Rome Statute of the ICC191 provides useful
186. Danner, supra note 179, at 47 (emphasis added).
187. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
188. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
189. See Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 1.
190. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 23 (statement of New Zealand, observing
that the "task [of the ICTY] is to apply independently and impartially the rules of customary
international" and that it "must be left to carry out its work until it has discharged its mandate
under its Statute or until the Council decides that its work shall be brought to an end," and
statement of Japan, observing that it is incumbent on the Security Council "to ensure that the
Tribunal is independent and neutral and that it reflects the universal authority of the United
Nations"), at 28 (statement of Morocco, observing that "the effectiveness and credibility of the
Tribunal, which must be independent and neutral, will depend on" being adequately supported
and resourced by the U.N. and member states), at 39-40 (statement of Spain, observing that "the
Tribunal does appear as a clearly independent organ"), U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter S/PV.3217].
191. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 183d Sess., 13th plen. mtg., at 63 (summarizing the remarks of the
President of the Rome Conference, observing that the "expectations of mankind must not be
disappointed" and, to that end, that the ICC "must be universal and independent so that it could
prosecute the most serious crimes impartially and efficiently"), at 66 (summarizing the remarks of
the delegate from Norway, proclaiming the commitment of Norway to the "establishment of a
strong and independent court"), at 67 (summarizing the remarks of the delegate from Japan,
emphasizing that the ICC "should be a strictly independent and impartial judicial organ of the
international community, independent of any political influence, and its judgements should be
given exclusively on the basis of law"), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002).
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insight in support of the resolute commitment to the judicial inde-
pendence of the tribunals thus created. If the tribunals are intended to
adjudicate offenses in a manner that is independent from the interests
of states, the conception of tribunals as "agents" of the "principal" states
seems rather untenable.
A second, related factor that erodes the legitimacy of the principal-
agent construct is the persistent reluctance of several specially affected
states to submit to the jurisdiction of the "agent" tribunals. The
ongoing saga19- of the application by the ICC Prosecutor to investigate
allegations of war crimes committed in Afghanistan is a conspicuous
illustration of the sovereignty and jurisdiction concerns expressed by
many specially affected states-here, the United States in particular-
with submitting to the authority of an international criminal tribunal.
Vociferous opposition expressed by relevant officials in the previous
U.S. administration1 93 is set against the backdrop of legislation, pejora-
tively referred to as the "Hague Invasion Act," that has granted standing
domestic authority for the president to use "all means necessary and
appropriate to bring about the release of' any U.S. service member
"who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request
of the International Criminal Court" since the legislation was enacted
in 2002.194
192. See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17 OA4, Judgment on
Appeal Against Decision on Authorisation of an Investigation (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.pdf (authorizing the Prosecutor to commence an investigation
in relation to alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan).
193. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36, 139 (June 11, 2020), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-15/pdf/2020-12953.pdf (observing that the "United States
is not a party to the Rome Statute, has never accepted ICC jurisdiction over its personnel, and has
consistently rejected ICC assertions ofjurisdiction over United States personnel" while directing
imposition of economic sanctions and travel restrictions on persons, businesses, or organizations
assisting with the investigation or prosecution of U.S. personnel); Press Statement, Michael R.
Pompeo, Sec'y of State, ICC Decision on Afghanistan (Mar. 5, 2020), www.state.gov/icc-decision-
on-afghanistan (describing the ICC as an "unaccountable political institution, masquerading as a
legal body" and reinforcing that he United States "will take all necessary measures to protect [its]
citizens from this renegade, so-called court"); John Bolton, former National Security Advisor,
Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats (Sept. 10,
2018), reprinted in National Security Adviser John Bolton Remarks to Federalist Society, LAWFARF
(Sept. 10, 2018, 2:43 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-
federalist-society (expressing pride in leading the 2002 effort to "un-sign" the Rome Statute and
asserting, among other objections to the tribunal, that the ICC "unacceptably threatens American
sovereignty and U.S. national security interests").
194. 22 U.S.C. g 7427 (2014). For context, the official title of the legislation is "Authority to
free members of the Armed Forces of the United States and certain other persons detained or
imprisoned by or on behalf of the International Criminal Court."
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The United States is, of course, by no means the only state that rou-
tinely engages in foreign military activities and has expressed reluc-
tance to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Representatives of
Israel,195 Russia,'96 and China,97 for example, have expressed similar
concerns. If the only permanent international criminal tribunal with
the potential to subject officials of such states to criminal process and to
enforce a criminal sanction imposed were truly an "agent" of the "prin-
cipal" states that have ratified the Rome Statute, one would suppose
that these specially affected states would have no reason to be con-
cerned with the prospect of submitting to the jurisdiction of the "agent"
tribunal. Reasonable opinions may certainly vary regarding whether
this reluctance to ratify is valid based on the complementarity principle
instituted by the Rome Statute. Varying opinions notwithstanding, the
fact remains that a number of significant states remain unwilling to vol-
untarily become subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, and this reluc-
tance would not be a factor if the tribunal were truly an "agent" of the
states that ratify the Rome Statute.
The final, and perhaps most significant, factor to be addressed
herein suggesting the miscalculation of the principal-agent model is
that the construct fails to explain how it is that judicial opinions from
the "agent" tribunals could become binding on the "principal" states as
a matter of customary international law. If customary international law
is supposed to be binding on all states, excluding persistent objectors
(except that peremptory norms cannot be the subject of objection),
what conceptual or legal mechanism operates to bind the principal to
195. Times of Israel Staff & Agencies, Netanyahu Says ICC Decision not to Probe US. Troops Bodes
Well for Israel, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 14, 2019), www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-icc-
decision-not-to-probe-us-troops-bodes-well-for-israel (reporting that PM Benjamin Netanyahu
described as "absurd" the idea that the ICC would investigate American or Israeli troops because
such action would represent "the opposite of the original purpose of the International Criminal
Court").
196. Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministiy, THE MINISIRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION (Nov. 16, 2016), www.mid.u/en/mainen/-/assetpublisher/G51infMMNKX/content/
id/2523566 (conveying the intent to withdraw the signature of the Russian Federation from the Rome
Statute while expressing that the government "can hardly trust the ICC" after the tribunal indicated the
intent to investigate potential offenses committed in Georgia in 2008).
197. U.N. GAOR, 74th Sess., 25th plen. mtg. at 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/74/PV.25 (Nov. 4, 2019)
(asserting that the "Pre-Trial Chamber [of the ICC] has unduly expanded its jurisdiction to the
point of blurring the boundaries between States parties and non-States parties" and expressing
the hope of China that the ICC "will carefully exercise its authority, in strict accordance with the
Rome Statute, to ensure that its judicial activities are in line with basic principles of international
law").
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opinions of the agents? Absent a satisfactory answer to this question,
the principal-agent model is left wanting.
One potential solution to this puzzle could be to borrow from the
law of agency in basic contract law. As Allison Danner observes, "[p]rin-
cipals often delegate the task of completing contracts (or lawmaking,
in the context of a court) to agents."198 As such, according to Danner,
"[t]hat international courts engage in lawmaking is unsurprising to
those who study principal-agent relationships."199
While there can be no doubt that states expressly establish interna-
tional criminal tribunals to adjudicate grave breaches and serious viola-
tions of international law, there is no evidence to suggest that states
either expressly or impliedly consent to allowing international criminal
tribunals to formulate law that would be binding on states. To carry the
questionable contract law analogy to conclusion, states do not express
or imply a grant of such authority, and there is no conduct of states that
could lead to a reasonable belief of such a grant and thereby support a
claim of apparent authority. The assertion that the "lawmaking"
capacity of international criminal tribunals should be "unsurprising to
those who study principal-agent relationships" is, at best, doubtful
absent evidence that states intend to be bound by "law" that is formu-
lated by the "agent" tribunals.
Considering "international case-law" to be a suggestion of potential
customary law that states may or may not adopt would be a way to make
the principal-agent construct more accurate conceptually. That would
essentially be a practical application of what proponents of the "mod-
ern" approach to describing sources of customary international law
would describe as the "traditional" model, and the jurisprudence would
thus be confirmed to be a subsidiary source of law. However, this is not
how "international case-law" is utilized in existing literature that applies
the principal-agent model. Observations such as those by Cassese that
"current international law must be taken to allow for recklessness" to be
included in the mental element of the Rome Statute200 and of
Dormann that it is "up to the future judges of the ICC" to bring the
mental element applied by that tribunal "in line" with opinions from
the ICTY 0 1 do not treat jurisprudence from the ICTY as a subsidiary
source. The same is true for the related observation that opinions from
198. Danner, supra note 179, at 48.
199. Id.
200. Cassese, supra note 169.
201. Dormann, supra note 171.
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international criminal tribunals set the standard to which states must
adhere in order to comply with customary international law.202
The conventional application of the principal-agent construct
utilizes "international case-law"-at least, the particular strain that sup-
ports the preferred outcome-as a source that is capable of independ-
ently establishing the standard with which other tribunals, and even
states, must comply as a matter of customary law. This represents a "law-
making" function that exceeds status as a mere subsidiary source.
However, proponents of this application fail to address a stark concep-
tual deficiency inherent with this formulation. In some manner, juris-
prudence of the "agent" tribunals must be demonstrated to be capable
of binding the "principal" states even though states have not expressed
or implied the extension of such authority to international criminal tri-
bunals. Absent a satisfactory explanation, the "principal-agent" model
of the "lawmaking" capacity of international criminal tribunals is ren-
dered conceptually inadequate.
If the popular principal-agent model is demonstrably deficient for at
least the three reasons examined above, what, then, is the exact nature
of the relationship between states and international criminal tribunals?
That answer requires a more nuanced application of the types of juris-
diction exercised by states as well as a more precise treatment of the
inefficiencies inherent in international law that international criminal
tribunals are created to address than the prevailing principal-agent
model employs. The result is the designate and extend model that is
described in the next section.
B. Designate and Extend Model ofDescribing Relationship Between States and
Tribunals
The endeavor to develop a more conceptually accurate model to
describe the relationship between states and international criminal tri-
bunals begins by recalling the three general types of jurisdiction exer-
cised by states. While elementary, a brief summary is useful since the
designate and extend model established herein applies the different
202. See, e.g., Letter from Sarah Margon, supra note 1, at 2; Haque, supra note 7; Sarah
Knuckey, Anjli Parrin & Keerthana Nimmala, US Government Concludes no "War Crimes" in Kunduz
Strike, But Fails to Explain Why, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 29, 2016), www.justsecurity.org/30831/
government-concludes-war-crimes-kunduz-strike-fails-explain (challenging the conclusion from
the U.S. Central Command summary memorandum regarding the Kunduz attack that
recklessness is not included on the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes by citing (but not
identifying) "a number of international cases" that "have found that 'recklessness' or indirect
intent' could satisfy the intent requirement").
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categories of jurisdiction separately. For this purpose, the American
Law Institute Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law provides
a succinct summary from which to draw. The Restatement describes
prescriptive jurisdiction as "the authority of a state to make law applica-
ble to persons, property, or conduct";203 adjudicative jurisdiction as
"the authority of a state to apply law to persons or things, in particular
through the processes of its courts or administrative tribunals";204 and
enforcement jurisdiction as "the authority of a state to exercise its
power to compel compliance with law. "205
The second relevant factor in the relationship between states and
international criminal tribunals that is helpful to recall is the specific
inefficiencies generated by international law that the tribunals are cre-
ated to address. One common theme, to end impunity for violations of
the most egregious violations of international law, animates the aspira-
tion of the entire body of international criminal law. This aspiration is
expressed in the establishing charters for the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) 2o6 and the ICC207 as well as in the Security Council reso-
lutions creating the ICTY,208 ICTR,20 9 and hybrid tribunals.210
The pernicious impunity that stimulated the development of con-
temporary international criminal law with the establishment of the IMT
203. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §401 (a) (AM. L. INST. 2018).
204. Id. §401(b).
205. Id. §401(c).
206. IMT Statute, supra note 155, pmbl. (expressing the "intention that War Criminals shall be
brought to justice" and permitting the IMT to exercise jurisdiction "without prejudice" to states
that will adjudicate offenses in the "case of war criminals whose offences have no particular
geographical location").
207. Rome Statute, supra note 25, pmbl. (expressing the determination "to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of' crimes that are characterized as "unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity").
208. S.C. Res. 827, pmbl. (May 25, 1993) (expressing the determination to "put an end" to
atrocity crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and "to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for" the crimes).
209. S.C. Res. 955, pmbl. (Nov. 8, 1994) (expressing the same determination as indicated in
the previous footnote but in relation to offences committed in Rwanda).
210. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1272, pmbl. & art. 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (expressing "concern at reports
indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law have been committed in East Timor" and "stressing that persons committing
such violations bear individual responsibility" while establishing the United Nations Mission in
East Timor, which is "empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice"); S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl. (Aug. 14, 2000) (expressing deep concern
regarding "the very serious crimes committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against the
people of Sierra Leone and United Nations and associated personnel and at the prevailing
situation of impunity").
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after World War II and that continues as the animating spirit for the
body of law today is created by discernible inefficiencies in contempo-
rary international law. The exalted value of the territorial integrity of
states, which permeates international law but takes elemental textual
form in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is the wellspring of the primary
inefficiency. If a grave breach or serious violation of international law is
committed at a time and in a place where there is no state that is able
and willing to adjudicate the offense, there exists little prospect that
the alleged perpetrator will face justice. The same is true if a national
court could adjudicate the offense but the alleged perpetrator is located
in the territory of a state that is unwilling or unable to institute a genu-
ine inquiry involving the alleged offenses. Absent some legitimate inter-
nationalized mechanism, the dominant value of the territorial integrity
of states frustrates the aspiration to end impunity for perpetrators of
grave breaches or serious violations of international law.
It is the desire to correct this discernible inefficiency, created by the
tension between the value of territorial integrity and the aspiration to
end impunity, that constitutes the raison d'etre of international crimi-
nal law. When this inefficiency is collated with the three general catego-
ries of jurisdiction exercised by states, the designate and extend model
of describing the relationship between states and international criminal
tribunals takes shape. Applied to the categories of jurisdiction, the inef-
ficiency is extant only in the adjudicative and enforcement categories.
This central observation mandates that prescriptions of international
law be treated differently from endeavors to adjudicate offenses or
enforce judicial orders rendered pursuant to the prescribed law. The
designate and extend model accomplishes this mandate, while the pre-
vailing principal-agent approach fails to do so.
1. Establishing the Parameters of the Designate and Extend Model
Regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, the relevant collection of
states21' acts to "designate" the law to be applied by the international tri-
bunal being established. The collection of states does not require the
211. For the IMT, the "relevant collection of states" was initially "the Signatories" (U.K.,
United States, France, and USSR) and it was subsequently these states, plus the collection of states
reflected in footnote 1 of the IMT Charter, that provided notice to the U.K government of
adherence pursuant to article 5 of the IMT Charter. IMT Statute, supra note 155, at 280 n.I. For
the ICTY and ICTR, the "relevant collection of states" was the Security Council acting pursuant to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. For hybrid tribunals created in coordination with the United
Nations, the "relevant collection of states" is the Security Council or General Assembly,
depending on the tribunal, and the applicable domestic authority. For the ICC, the "relevant
collection of states" refers to the states-party to the Rome Statute.
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tribunal being established to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction because
there is no inefficiency to correct in relation to this category. An early
articulation in contemporary international law of the character of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction is offered in the Lotus majority opinion of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. Specifically, the observation
that "every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as
best and most suitable"" is a succinct articulation of prescriptive
jurisdiction.
In the present application, it is the relevant collection of states that is
acting to "adopt the principles which" the states regard "as best and
most suitable." As the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law
explains, "Customary international law permits exercises of prescriptive
jurisdiction if there is a genuine connection between the subject of the
regulation and the state seeking to regulate .... In the case of universal
jurisdiction, the genuine connection rests on the universal concern of
states in suppressing certain offenses."213 In the context of establishing
international criminal tribunals, the relevant states exercise prescrip-
tive jurisdiction collectively, and the "genuine connection" is articu-
lated in the aspiration to end impunity for perpetrators of grave
breaches and serious violations of international law. There is no inher-
ent inefficiency that needs to be addressed as the relevant collection of
states exercise prescriptive jurisdiction. The charter promulgated to es-
tablish a particular tribunal constitutes the prescription of law the tribu-
nal is to apply. By establishing this prescription, the relevant collection
of states "designates" the applicable law.
While there is no constraint prohibiting the relevant collection of
states from freely exercising prescriptive jurisdiction, the fundamental
inefficiency described above involving international law frustrates the
exercise of adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. Turning again
to Lotus, the majority opinion notes that a state "should not overstep
the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction. "214 In the
present application, the preeminent value placed on territorial integ-
rity constitutes the central "limit" that frustrates the effort to adjudicate
offenses and enforce judgments.1 It is the inefficiency inherent in
212. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), Collection of Judgments, 1927 PCIJ (set. A)
No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7) [hereinafter Lotus].
213. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 203, § 407.
214. Lotus, supra note 212, at 19.
215. Regarding the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, it is helpful to further divide
this category into pre-adjudicative and post-adjudicative subcategories. Both subcategories
represent a separate inefficiency in international law. Inefficiencies inherent in pre-adjudicative
enforcement are addressed primarily by extradition agreements, provisions in multilateral
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these two categories of jurisdiction, adjudicative and enforcement,
that needs to be addressed since there is no state able and willing to
take the action that would be needed to achieve the aspiration of end-
ing impunity. International criminal tribunals are the tools created
by the relevant collection of states to correct this inefficiency, and the
method of employing these tools is to "extend" adjudicative and
enforcement jurisdiction from the collective of states to the tribunals
thus established.
In describing this process, the term "extend" is carefully and delib-
erately selected rather than "delegate" because of the expectation of
tribunal independence detailed above. The terms may appear sub-
stantially similar at first glance, but it is a distinction with a difference.
Describing this process using the term "extend" is most appropriate
given the independent, quasi-state role international criminal tribu-
nals perform in the exercise of adjudicative and (post-adjudicative)
enforcement jurisdiction. As long as the relevant collection of states
does not substantially alter or revoke the establishing statute, the tri-
bunal is expected to employ these two categories ofjurisdiction inde-
pendently, in the same manner as a state. It is exclusively in these two
specific categories ofjurisdiction, then, that the tribunals can be con-
sidered to possess a degree of comity with states.
Put another way, in the exercise of adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction, international criminal tribunals are conceptually an
extension of the relevant collection of states. Describing this rela-
tionship as a "delegation" in line with the principal-agent model
implies a superior-subordinate relationship in which the principal
has discretion to direct and, when necessary, to correct the conduct
of the agent. This description is conceptually problematic because
the directing and, when necessary, correcting by states occurs in
relation to prescriptive jurisdiction when the relevant collection of
states designates or modifies the formulation of the law to be
applied by the applicable tribunal. A delegation inherent in a prin-
cipal-agent relationship entails a degree of control that belies the
treaties permitting so-called "universal" jurisdiction, and cooperation provisions such as those
found in the Rome Statute. While these agreements and provisions do not completely mitigate
the inefficiency created by the value of territorial integrity, the provisions attempt to achieve an
acceptable balance between separate values such as sovereignty and political independence. The
inefficiency inherent in post-adjudicative enforcement is less pronounced, assuming that some
pre-enforcement mechanism has secured the presence of the defendant before the relevant
international tribunal. Post-adjudicative enforcement inefficiency is addressed by cooperation
agreements with states allowing states to effectuate incarceration penalties that result from the
judicial proceeding adjudicated by the tribunal.
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independence expected of tribunals when exercising adjudicative
and enforcement jurisdiction.
Consolidating these two distinct functions-designate and extend-
requires conceptualizing the statutes of international criminal tribu-
nals as separate and distinct from judicial opinions that emerge from
the tribunals. The statutes constitute circumstantial, if not direct, evi-
dence of state practice because the relevant collection of states is act-
ing to prescribe, or designate, the law to be applied by the applicable
tribunal. The principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, requires
the relevant collection of states to articulate and endorse the custom-
ary law that binds all states universally. The judicial decisions that
flow from tribunals, however, are a necessary function of exercising
the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction extended to the tribu-
nals. Explicitly or implicitly ascribing lawmaking authority to judicial
opinions of international criminal tribunals is problematic because
prescriptive jurisdiction was not extended or otherwise transferred
from the relevant collection of states to the applicable tribunal in the
first instance.
Applying this designate and extend model to the progression of
statutes of international criminal and selected hybrid tribunals and
separately to the judicial opinions that flow therefrom reveals the
gradual yet steady expansion and solidification of what has become
accepted as customary international law in the present context. This
application confirms the status of prescriptions reflected in statutes
as primary, or at least near primary, sources of customary interna-
tional law, as the relevant collection of states "designates" the law to
be applied by the tribunal being established. Similarly, judicial
opinions from international criminal tribunals are confirmed as
subsidiary sources of law, as the tribunals are merely exercising the
extent of the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction the relevant
collection of states "extends" to the tribunals. In this progression of
discernible prescriptions of customary international law, the Rome
Statute emerges as the exemplar formulation that constitutes a par-
adigm shift in the understanding of what is widely accepted as
customary.
2. The Evolution of Statutes as Prescriptions in the Designate and
Extend Model
Prior to the Rome Statute, the substantive war crimes provisions of
international criminal statutes followed the lead of the IMT and incor-
porated formulations involving means and methods of warfare from
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the Hague Regulations.216 By the time the ICTY statute was established
in 1993, Additional Protocol I had been in force for over just over fif-
teen years. The text of AP I substantially expands on the "undefended
towns" expression of the distinction rule articulated in Hague, IV of
1907 by prohibiting, among similar conduct, making the "civilian popu-
lation as such, as well as individual civilians . . . the object of attack."217
Although AP I had entered into force over fifteen years prior and the
treaty offers significantly more detail in relation to the distinction rule
than Hague, IV, the group of experts tasked to draft the text of the
ICTY statute eschewed AP I as a source from which to draw articulations
of customary international law that would be included in the ICTY
statute.
The reluctance to draw explicitly from AP I as a primary source for
the ICTY statute was founded upon the legality principle. As Virginia
Morris and Michael P. Scharf observe, even fifteen years after entering
into force, AP I "could not be said to be in all essential respects beyond
doubt customary law either on the basis of virtually universal accep-
tance or an authoritative pronouncement on behalf of the interna-
tional community."1 The standard for the nullum crimen sine lege
requirement articulated by the Secretary-General in the report submit-
ted to the Security Council advocates that the ICTY "should apply rules
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law."219 According to a scholarly observation that was a con-
temporary of the court, the judges of the IMT, "considered that the
Hague Convention on land warfare was declaratory of customary inter-
national law binding all the belligerents. "22 The fledgling UN Security
216. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 3
(c), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Libraiy/Statute/statutesept09_en.pdf (establishing
the offense of "attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings"), with IMT Statute, supra note 155, art. 6(b) (establishing the offense of
"wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity"),
and Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 25, Oct. 18, 1907,
6 U.S.T. 3616 (prohibiting "attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended") [hereinafter Hague, IV].
217. AP I, supra note 48, art. 51(2).
218. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 62
n.207 (1995).
219. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, 1 34, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General
ICTY Report].
220. Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L., 38, 60 (Jan. 1947) (citing
the IMT judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in the same volume of AJIL from pp. 172-333 at 248,
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Council endorsed the legal basis of the International Military Tribunal
in 1946,221 further solidifying the status of Hague, IV as an articulation
of customary international law. By 1993, Hague, IV, along with the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, were sufficiently
"beyond any doubt part of customary law" such that the ICTY statute
could draw directly from them. AP I, at the time, did not qualify.
While AP I was eschewed as a standalone source of customary law for
the ICTY statute,222 state delegates involved in the Rome process just
five years later drew heavily on AP I for the substantive offenses
reflected in the Rome Statute. The task of the delegates to Rome in
1998 was similar to that of the Security Council in establishing the ICTY
statute in 1993: to design a formulation of existing customary law that
would be applied by the tribunal being established. However, delegates
of the 160 states that met to deliberate the text of what would become
known as the Rome Statute did so for the express purpose of establish-
ing a permanent, standing international criminal tribunal that does
not rely on an assorted collection of treaties from which to extrapolate
articulations of customary international law.223 Moreover, the state rep-
resentatives were engaged in the deliberations for the Rome Statute
with the knowledge that the final text would become an issue of direct
domestic political importance when the treaty was ultimately presented
to the applicable national lawmaking process of each delegation for ap-
proval and ratification.224 These factors operate to establish the pre-
scription of law reflected in the Rome Statute as an exceedingly
probative proxy for state practice. In the Rome Statute, significant
which observes that "by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all
civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war").
221. See G.A. Res. 95(I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1946), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_95-I/
ga_95-I_phe.pdf.
222. The establishing statute for the ICTR, as a contemporary of the ICTY statute, can be
included in this observation as well. The similarity in subject matter can be summarized by the
observation of the Secretary-General that the ICTR constitutes "an adaptation of the statute of the
Yugoslav Tribunal to the circumstances of Rwanda." U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb.
13, 1995).
223. See Darryl Robinson & Herman von Hebel, War Crimes in Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of The
ICC Statute, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 193, 194, 208 (1999).
224. See, e.g., II Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 122, at 280 (summary of
statement by U.S. representative, observing that "the effectiveness of the Court would largely be
judged by the willingness of a significant number of States to join in the treaty and assist the Court
in bringing individuals to justice" and that the tribunal's "membership would be limited if it
sought to overreach established customary international law or set aside national judicial
principles").
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portions of AP I for the first time joined longstanding treaties such
as Hague, IV, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Genocide
Convention as sources from which to draw formulations of custom-
ary law.
The extent of the persuasiveness of the text of the Rome Statute as a
prescription of customary international law is revealed by comparing
the content of the statute for the ICTY with that for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL). While the ICTY statute shuns AP I in favor of
longstanding predecessors, the statute for the SCSL includes the
offense of "[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian popula-
tion as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hos-
tilities" among the list of war crimes.225 Not only is this provision
extrapolated directly from the Rome Statute,22 6 which in turn is based
the distinction rule reflected in AP 1,227 but it is the first tribunal statute
established under the auspices of the United Nations22 8 to include the
mens rea requirement of "intentional."
With the exemplar text of the Rome Statute recently adopted, the
process of establishing the prescription for a tribunal to apply became
relegated to an afterthought. When the Security Council approved cre-
ation of the SCSL by adopting UNSCR 1315 in August 2000, the Rome
Statute had only existed for two years and only fourteen states had rati-
fied the treaty.229 Nonetheless, rather than approving the text of the
SCSL statute directly, the Security Council merely recommends a list of
225. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 4(a), Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.
226. SeeRome Statute, supra note 25, arts. 8(b) (i), 8(e) (i).
227. See AP I, supra note 48, art. 51(2) (establishing that "[t]he civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack").
228. Two months before the SCSL was established, the UNTAET adopted a regulation
establishing panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offenses, and this regulation
incorporates a similar war crime formulation that is identical to a Rome Statute provision, which
in turn is based on the distinction rule articulated in AP I. See U.N. Transitional Administration in
East Timor, Regulation no. 2000/15, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000), www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c082f8/pdf. On the establishment of panels with exclusive jurisdiction over
serious criminal offences, see id. art. 6(1) (b). Although this regulation is an additional indication
of the centrality of the Rome Statute as a prescription of customary international law, the present
inquiry does not focus on this UNTAET regulation because it was adopted by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General rather than by a relevant collection of states. As such, this
regulation, while informative, is of limited value to the present inquiry.
229. Security Council Resolution 1315 was adopted on Aug. 14, 2000, and according to the
chronological listing of state parties that is published by the ICC Assembly of State Parties (ASP),
fourteen states had acceded to or ratified the Rome Statute on that date (Mali would become the
15th member two days later). See ICC ASP, States Parties - Chronological list, https://asp.icc-cpi.
int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/states%20parties%20_%20chronological%20list.aspx (last
visited Oct. 22, 2020).
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the offenses to be included3 0 and requests that the Secretary-General
report back to the Security Council after the establishing resolution is
implemented.23'
The record of the Security Council meeting at which UNSCR 1315
was adopted and the SCSL established indicates that the resolution was
unanimously approved by the Council in a matter of ten minutes, with
no member of the Council speaking other than the president, who
essentially announced the item on the agenda and called for a vote.232
The mere existence of the Rome Statute and the process that had led
to its formation relegated the matter of establishing subject matter ju-
risdiction for the SCSL to an afterthought to be entrusted to the
Secretary-General to sort out. Such is the procedural significance of the
Rome Statute as an authoritative prescription of relevant international
law.
3. Consolidating the Designate and Extend Model: Distinguishing
Between Statutes and Judicial Opinions
With the prescriptions reflected in statutes of international criminal tri-
bunals established as proxies for state practice, judicial opinions that flow
from the tribunals can reenter the present inquiry. Like other subsidiary
sources of customary law, these judicial opinions can provide an informa-
tive indication of the content of international law. Jurisprudence from
the ICTY was extraordinarily influential in the deliberations that led to
the creation of the Rome Statute of the ICC, for example, as delegates
often brought "copies of key [ICTY decisions with their materials for the
negotiations" that led to adoption of the Rome Statute.233 However, the
decisions of international criminal tribunals do not constitute an inde-
pendent primary source of law.
In establishing the prescription to be applied by the applicable tribu-
nal, even the relevant collection of states does not possess independent
legislative authority. Rather, the task of the relevant states is to "desig-
nate" the law as it exists from a survey of general state practice.234
Tracking the development of the statutes over time reveals the
230. S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl. (Aug. 14, 2000).
231. Id. ¶6.
232. See U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4186 (Aug. 14, 2000).
233. Danner, supra note 179, at 35.
234. See, e.g., Secretary-General ICTY Report, supra note 219, 1 29 (emphasizing that "the
Security Council would not be creating or purporting to 'legislate"' applicable customary
international law and that, instead, the ICTY "would have the task of applying existing"
international law (emphasis added)).
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progression of what is widely accepted as customary law. The statute for
the ICTY lacks much of the detail of its ICC counterpart, and this scar-
city of detail can be attributed to the concern that getting bogged down
in details during deliberations would threaten to derail the entire pro-
ject.235 With much of the specific detail omitted from the statute in
favor of expediency and consensus in the Security Council, judges of
the ICTYwere later left to fill in the gaps.
The "international case-law" that emanated from the ICTYwas avail-
able to and considered by the delegates that participated in the Rome
process. Although it was suggested during preparations for the Rome
Conference that the statute for the ICC might follow the example of
the ICTY statute and leave judges to devise much of the substantive
detail to be applied by the tribunal, this approach was rejected by the
delegates that participated in the Rome process.236 While consulting ju-
risprudence from predecessor tribunals, including the ICTY, and
resolving to articulate detailed prescriptions for the judges of the ICC
to apply, delegates from the 160 states that participated in the Rome
process devised a thorough and detailed statute that would set the
example for later similar endeavors to follow. The Rome Statute, then,
represents a pristine proxy for general state practice and, as such, con-
stitutes an exemplar customary articulation involving prescriptions for
grave breaches and serious violations of international law.
The endeavor to rely on judicial opinions as direct evidence of con-
trolling customary international law is problematic because this degree
of authority was not vested in tribunals ab initio. It is not up to the
future judges of the ICC to bring the Rome Statute in line with jurispru-
dence from the ICTY and adopt the mens rea formulations derived by
the judges of the ICTY, as Cassese237 and D6rmann238 suggest. Nor is it
incumbent upon states to implement formulations derived from ICTY
judicial opinions in order to comply with customary international law,
235. As the delegate from Spain observed during the deliberations that led to the creation of
the ICTY, "the goal of restoring peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia requires prompt
action, which might have been compromised through a prolonged and detailed discussion of a
Statute which satisfies the fundamental prerequisites for ensuring the achievement of that goal."
S/PV.3217, supra note 190, at 39.
236. See Clark, supra note 13, at 298 (recalling that the delegates at the Rome Conference "set
forth on an 'arduous task of comparative criminal law synthesis'" rather than, as the "Updated
Siracusa Draft" indicated to be the alternative, leaving the establishing statute "to delegate to the
ICT the power to promulgate, before it starts any proceedings and in accordance with the
principles contained in the Statute, whatever additional norms are needed").
237. See Cassese, supra note 169.
238. See Ddrmann, supra note 171.
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as suggested by scholars239 and advocacy organizations such as Human
Rights Watch.240 Relying exclusively on judicial opinions from "interna-
tional case-law" to support a purported rule of customary international
law, as does the central recklessness assertion reflected in Rule 156 of
the ICRC CIHL study, is similarly inadequate because it assigns a
degree of authority to judicial decisions that does not exist, conceptu-
ally or in practice.
Salient prescriptions of customary international law are reflected in
the progression of the statutes for international criminal tribunals, with
the Rome Statute being at the apex of this progression. Judicial opinions
that emanate from the various tribunals simply represent a necessary
function of exercising the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction that
is extended by the relevant collection of states to the applicable tribunal
in order to address discernible deficiencies created by operation of inter-
national law. As applying the designate and extend model confirms, it is
not the case that "international judicial lawmaking may be the truth of
international politics that cannot be named," as Allison Danner sug-
gests.24' Rather, the popular narrative of "international judicial lawmak-
ing" is simply not the truth at all.
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Two separate unsettled matters that are central to the theory and
practice of public international law are addressed by the dual inquiries
above, with the goal of bringing a degree of clarity to both issues of con-
cern. Regarding the substantive aspect of the recklessness assertion, the
issue of whether "international case-law" actually does establish that
recklessness is included on the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes,
the inquiry conducted in Part One concludes that the reality is rather
more nuanced than the prevailing perspective supports. Jurisprudence
of international criminal tribunals does support the recklessness asser-
tion, but only in limited, identifiable circumstances. The assertion that
recklessness is sufficient in a general targeting context, as the prevailing
narrative suggests, is not supported by a careful and thorough assess-
ment of "international case-law."
Regarding the procedural aspect of the recklessness assertion, the
issue of whether "international case-law" can be utilized as an inde-
pendent, authoritative primary source of customary international law,
239. See, e.g., Haque, supra note 7; Knuckey, Pariin & Nimmala, supra note 202.
240. See Letter from Sarah Margon, supra note 1, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH reports, supra
text accompanying note 4.
241. Danner, supra note 179, at 47 (emphasis added).
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the inquiry conducted in Part Two once again demonstrates that the
conclusion is more complex than the prevailing principal-agent model
suggests. The designate and extend model described in Part Two
accounts for the inefficiencies in international law that international
criminal tribunals are created to address and adopts a more nuanced
approach to the types of jurisdiction exercised by states. The examina-
tion in Part Two demonstrates that statutes of the tribunals constitute
prescriptive jurisdiction exercised as the relevant collection of states
"designate" the law to be applied by the applicable tribunal, while judi-
cial decisions represent the exercise of the adjudicative and enforce-
ment jurisdiction "extended" to the tribunal by the relevant collection
of states. Pursuant to the designate and extend model thus described,
the statutes represent primary sources as proxies to state practice, while
judicial decisions are confirmed to be subsidiary sources of law.
Turning first to the substantive inquiry from Part One, the conclusion
that recklessness is only included in the spectrum of mens rea applicable
for war crimes in limited circumstances is consistent with the theory and
practice of the conduct of hostilities. The detainee abuse context, con-
sistent with the ICTY Delalit line of cases, is conceptually and practically
distinct from the general targeting context, consistent with the Gali line.
The presumption of necessity and the knowledge environment in the
detainee context are not compatible with the general targeting context.
Setting aside the questionable recklessness assertion in the detainee
abuse context, the direct analogy between the detention and targeting
contexts is conceptually and factually inadequate.
In the general targeting context, focusing on the risk of a proscribed
outcome, as does the prevailing recklessness assertion, distorts the dis-
tinction rule upon which the relevant war crime is based. Based on the
nature of targeting in armed conflict, an attacker is aware of a risk that
civilian persons or objects will be injured or damaged before engaging
in nearly every attack. To extend recklessness a half-step further to
include the related concept of dolus eventualis, the attacker can be
inferred to reconcile herself with that potential outcome before engag-
ing in nearly every attack. Adopting this mens rea formulation distorts
the distinction rule upon which the applicable war crime is founded by
presuming culpability based on the outcome of the attack. If the ostensi-
ble requirement is simply that an attacker is aware of the risk of inciden-
tal damage and it is factually true that the attacker is aware of such a
risk before nearly every attack, then any attack that results in incidental
damage presumptively qualifies as a war crime.
This recklessness formulation distorts the conduct on which the ap-
plicable war crime-making civilian persons or objects the object of
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attack-is founded. It is illogical to conclude that the distinction rule
can be violated based solely on an awareness of the risk that civilians
may be injured or killed in an attack, especially because that risk applies
to nearly every targeting scenario. Civilian persons or objects cannot be
said to be the "object of attack" if the attacker does not at least have
knowledge that the person or object being attacked qualifies for civilian
status.
What scholars, advocates, and relevant judicial opinions of interna-
tional criminal tribunals seem to be attempting to accomplish by pur-
porting to include recklessness on the spectrum of mens rea for war
crimes is developing an objective process by which to evaluate what is,
by design, an inherently subjective standard. While this is a laudable
aspiration, purporting to expand the relevant mental element to
include recklessness is not actually required to achieve the desired out-
come. The factual understanding that develops when assessing the cir-
cumstances known to an attacker prior to the attack can lead to an
objective deduction that refutes the subjective claim of the defendant
that she was not aware of the civilian nature of the person or object
attacked. This endeavor occurs in the ICTY Galic trial chamber decision
that establishes the recklessness line of cases involving the general tar-
geting context.
In Gali, the defendant directed a sustained shelling and sniping
campaign that indiscriminately targeted the civilian population of
Sarajevo. The factual details ascertained by the trier of fact are adequate
to objectively repudiate the subjective assertion that the defendant did
not violate the distinction rule and thereby commit war crimes. These
facts are sufficient to at least demonstrate knowledge in Galic, and the
risk-based recklessness formulation from the ICRC AP I Commentary
that is accepted but not applied by Galic and establishes this line of
recklessness cases for the tribunal is as factually superfluous as it is con-
ceptually problematic.
There are at least two other uses for the term "reckless" in scholar-
ship involving mens rea and war crimes, but these interpretations do
not appear to apply the term as it should be utilized in a valid legal anal-
ysis. One such use of "recklessness" is akin to a colloquial definition of
the term. To borrow from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as an exam-
ple, the definition of "reckless" is "marked by lack of proper caution" or
"careless of consequences."24 2 This definition is rather more imprecise
than the notion of taking action after reconciling oneself with a
242. Reckless, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reckless (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
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prohibited result, which constitutes a standard formulation of the con-
cept of dolus eventualis.243 The informal, colloquial application of the
term "recklessness" is utilized, by way of illustration, by a former repre-
sentative of Amnesty International when she refers to the factual record
of the attack on the MSF trauma center and observes, "[t]wenty-nine
minutes of bombing a hospital and no one notices that the wrong
building is being bombed - if that's not recklessness, I don't know what
is."244 This colloquial usage does not resemble the term "reckless" as it
is typically used as a legal term of art, but this rather more informal
meaning is often employed even when purporting to engage in a legal
analysis of whether a war crime was committed.
Similarly, the term "reckless" is sometimes erroneously utilized in an
ostensive war crimes analysis to evaluate whether an attacker "should
have known" of a particular factual condition before engaging in an
attack. For example, a Human Rights Watch report examining the con-
duct of hostilities in the current conflict in Yemen describes the circum-
stances of an attack that resulted in civilian casualties in 2016 that was
caused by inaccurate information related to the target of the airstrike.
In the analysis, the report asserts that "[r]egardless of the faulty intelli-
gence, coalition forces, both in the Yemen air operations center and in
Riyadh, either knew or should have known that any attack on the hall
would result in massive civilian casualties."245 This account of the fac-
tual circumstances the personnel directly involved in or otherwise
responsible for the airstrike purportedly "should have known"
before the attack is utilized in support of the assertion that the
"strike was an unlawfully indiscriminate or disproportionate attack
on civilians and civilian objects in violation of the laws of war" and
that the personnel "involved should be criminally investigated for
war crimes."2"
This assertion, in turn, is supported by a mens rea formulation in the
report suggesting that "[d] eliberate, indiscriminate, or disproportion-
ate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are serious violations of the
laws of war" that "[w]hen committed by an individual with criminal
243. See BADAR, supra note 14.
244. Jessica Schulberg & Sophia Jones, US. Military Investigates And Finds Itself Not Guilty Of War
Cimes In Afghan Hospital Bombing, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.
ca/enty/us-not-guilty-war-ciimes-kunduz-hospitaln_57236ddfe4b0b49df6ab0ada?ii18n=true.
245. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDING BEHIND THE COALITION: FAILURE TO CREDIBLY INVESTIGATE AND
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intent - that is, intentionally or recklessly - they are war crimes."27 The
contention that an attack can be characterized as "reckless," and there-
fore as a war crime, based on an assertion regarding information the
attacker should have known before engaging in the attack constitutes a
fundamental misapplication of the requirement to evaluate LOAC
compliance based on information that was reasonably available to the
relevant personnel at the time of the attack.248 Like the colloquial usage
described above, this "should have known" meaning does not faithfully
apply the formal dolus eventualis construct developed by the already
questionable jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals the
usages purportedly apply.
In a broader context, the endeavor of international tribunals to draw
directly from the constellation of comparative domestic criminal law
mens rea formulations to derive a general mental element for war
crimes constitutes a fool's errand at the outset. Domestic criminal law
frameworks are devised to promote social order where the presumption
is that a state exercises a monopoly on the use of force and individual
persons do not need to use force unless a lawful exception applies. This
raison d'etre of domestic criminal law is not compatible with an armed
conflict targeting scenario in which the attacker is required to use force
out of necessity to accomplish the role of combatant or fighter.
While the conceptual diversity between the law of armed conflict and
domestic criminal law applications may not be perceptible in some con-
texts, in others the theoretical foundations of the two are fundamen-
tally incompatible. An armed conflict detention context is conceptually
similar to a domestic law enforcement or general domestic criminal law
context in large part because the cluster concept of necessity249 oper-
ates in a similar fashion across all three fields. Drawing analogies from a
survey of national jurisdictions to inform the contours of the Geneva
stream of the law of armed conflict, then, can be a constructive
exercise.
This is not the case in the targeting context. The cluster concept of
necessity functions differently in the Hague stream of the law of armed
conflict than in the Geneva stream or in domestic contexts. A combat-
ant or other fighter is required and expected to use force to achieve a
defined military purpose, and in the targeting context a combatant or
fighter operates in a comparatively information poor environment that
247. Id. (emphasis added) (citing CIHL Study).
248. See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declaration and
Reservations for AP I, Re: Article 52, supra note 73.
249. See OHLIN & MAY, supra note 64.
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will result in a significant risk that a mistake of fact will occur. As the
ICTY Blaskic appeals chamber opinion notes while engaging in a survey
of national jurisdictions and citing an opinion from the High Court in
Australia, "[a] person who does an act causing death knowing that it is
probable that the act will cause death or grievous bodily harm is ...
guilty of murder."250 In an armed conflict targeting context, nearly ev-
ery attack is conducted in the knowledge that death or grievous bodily
harm will occur-this is by design and out of necessity. Attempting to
extrapolate from a comparison of varied domestic criminal law mens
rea formulations an authoritative mental element applicable to the
Hague stream of the law of armed conflict constitutes a category error
that renders the articulation conceptually and legally problematic.
If national jurisdictions are to be surveyed to develop a coherent
interpretation of the mental element that is valid in the targeting con-
text, domestic criminal codes of general application should not be the
focus. Rather, the inquiry should be centered on legislation, regula-
tions, judicial practice, and other military disciplinary measures
involved in adjudicating or otherwise addressing attacks that result in
unintended outcomes such as civilian casualties or fratricide in armed
conflict. While such a comparative examination is beyond the scope of
this Article, ongoing research conducted by the present author survey-
ing over 130 states supports the conclusion that recklessness is not
included in the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes in the targeting
context.
Although this conclusion is at odds with the prevalent recklessness
assertion, it should be expected based on the assessment of the Rome
Statute conducted in Part Two and on the process that created the
treaty. As Roger Clark notes in separate observations about his experi-
ence as a delegate in the Rome process, "[d] olus eventualis fell out of the
written discourse before" the Rome Conference"' and delegates "were
generally uncomfortable with liability based on recklessness or its civil
law (near) counterpart dolus eventualis."252 Given the nature of the pro-
cess that created the Rome Statute and the number of states that have
ratified the treaty, one would expect state practice in adjudicating
offenses in the specialized context of targeting mishaps in armed con-
flict to be largely consistent with the prescriptions of the Rome Statute,
250. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 37 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (citing R v Crabbe (1985) 58 ALR 417 [156 CLR 464], 470
(Aust.)).
251. Clark, supra note 13, at 301.
252. Clark, supra note 115, at 525.
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notwithstanding the vast comparative diversity that exists in general
domestic criminal practice.
Although canvassing general domestic criminal practice to divine
definitions for specialized concepts such as the mental element applica-
ble for the war crime of making civilians the object of attack may have
constituted a fool's errand at the ad hoc tribunals, it was an errand of
necessity. Such surveys may have been directed at the incorrect category
of comparative domestic practice in certain applications, but judges of
the ad hoc tribunals were required to develop much of the granular
detail since the Security Council prioritized consensus and expediency
over deliberating minutiae. This is not the case for the extensive and
detailed exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction reflected in the Rome
Statute.
Informed by the practice of predecessor tribunals and aware that cre-
ation of a permanent international criminal tribunal may subject
nationals of their own states to prosecution before the tribunal, dele-
gates deliberated and approved a text containing detailed prescriptions
of the law to be applied by the ICC. The Rome Statute is not inconsis-
tent with prior "precedent" established by jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals as many narratives involving the recklessness assertion sug-
gest. This perspective incorrectly confers "lawmaking" authority that
was not extended by the relevant collection of states to judges of inter-
national criminal tribunals. In the evolution of prescriptions of interna-
tional criminal law, the Rome Statute is the apex designation. Judicial
opinions of predecessor tribunals that are contrary to the Rome Statute
are inconsistent with customary international law, not the other way
around.
As for the ICRC articulation that provides analytical structure for the
present inquiry, this formulation fails on substantive and procedural
grounds. "International case-law" does indicate that recklessness is
included on the mens rea spectrum for war crimes, but the applicable
contexts are far more limited than the general observation from Rule
156 of the ICRC CIHL study supports. To the extent that the assertion
rests solely on judicial opinions (in this case, one) of international crim-
inal tribunals for authority, it fails procedurally as a purported formula-
tion of customary international law as well.
This assessment of the substantive and procedural deficiency of the
ICRC recklessness assertion is not affected by the noticeably equivocal
language employed by the articulation. If it were extracted from its
present context, the observation that "international case-law" has indi-
cated that recklessness is included on the spectrum of mens rea for war
crimes is supportable, with significant limitations. However, this
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observation is included as a "rule" of what purports to be a plenary sur-
vey of customary international law involving armed conflict. In this con-
text, the assertion is not treated as a benign, passing observation that
"international case-law has indicated" that recklessness is sufficient.
Instead, it is treated as evidence of a customary rule that recklessness is
included in generalon the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes by schol-
ars253 and advocacy groups25 4 alike.
To constitute a valid formulation of customary international law, the
recklessness assertion would need to present an accurate distillation of
the law that is founded upon authoritative sources. Instead, the ICRC
"rule" upon which the recklessness assertion is commonly based pro-
vides an incomplete and misleading characterization of "international
case-law" that is derived from subsidiary sources of customary law while
ignoring contrary "indications" from more authoritative sources. By
expressing a rule of general applicability without extensive limitations
and by relying on formulations derived from references such as opin-
ions of international tribunals that are confirmed to be subsidiary sour-
ces by application of the designate and extend model, Rule 156 of the
ICRC CIHL study and similar assertions that recklessness is included
on the spectrum of mens rea for war crimes as a matter of customary
international law are found wanting.
253. See CASEY-MASLEN & HAINES, supra note 6; Diane Bernabei & Beth Van Schaack, State Dept.
Inspector General Report: A Troubling Message on Arms Sales, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/72188/state-dept-inspector-general-linick-saudi-arms-sales (citing only to
ICRC CIHL Rule 156 as a reference establishing the definition for violations of "the laws of war
[and] the prohibition on war crimes" while describing a perceived "clear and dominant pattern
that has emerged around the [Saudi-led] Coalition's behavior in the war in Yemen - the reckless,
indiscriminate, or intentional targeting of civilians" (emphasis added)); Ryan Goodman,
Explainer: What Mental State is Required to Commit a War Crime?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32644/explainer-mental-state-required-commit-war-crime
(describing the author's perspective regarding the components of the war crime of "willful
killing" while citing to an ICRC Website containing, among other references, the ICRC
Commentary to AP I and asserting that violations of the LOAC distinction and proportionality
rules "include recklessness, for example, when the attacker consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of the harm to civilians and civilian objects").
254. See Letter from Sarah Margon, Washington Dir., Human Rights Watch, to Ashton Carter,
supra note 1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4.
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